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FOREWORD
W e coalminers earn our living in one of the most dangerous industries in 
the world. Our history is characterised by tragedy. The number of dead 
and crippled mineworkers is a reflection of the hostile environment in 
which we work.
History has shown us that unless we are prepared to learn from the 
lessons of the past we are condemned to repeat our mistakes. Experience 
has taught us that there is nothing more important in our industry than 
safety. For us, it is a constant matter of life and death. There is no single 
issue more important to our union than the responsibility of ensuring that 
when mineworkers begin their shifts, they are provided with the safest 
possible working environment so that at the end of the day they can return 
safely to their families and friends.
Disasters such as the one which occurred at Bulli have mobilised 
enormous community support for mineworkers' campaigns for improved 
safety regulations. Our history shows that employers and management 
cannot ensure safety in the mining industry. Workers must also 
contribute to this process. However, it will indeed be a tragic day when 
safety is sacrificed for profit.
The Bulli disaster is a classic lesson in history. Aggravated by severe 
economic circumstances in 1887 and returning to work after a protracted 
strike, the mineworkers had been forced to sign agreements which 
precluded them from questioning any management decisions let alone 
taking strike action. Miners who had raised safety issues under those 
circumstances were victimised. The neglect of safety issues led to the 
explosion at Bulli on March 23, 1887, which claimed the lives of 81 men 
and boys. Fifteen years later, another explosion at the nearby Mt. Kembla 
mine took the lives of another 96 mineworkers.
There are many other disasters in our history that could have been 
avoided if safety regulations had been strictly enforced. Our union has
fought for, and won the right to elect its own full-time safety officers and 
check inspectors, whose responsibility includes the inspection of mines 
without notice and ensuring that all safety standards are observed. There 
have been improvements in safety regulations in our industry but we 
know these standards will not be maintained and improved upon without 
the constant vigilance of our union.
With our industry today dominated by giant multinational corporations, 
there is the increasing pressure for even greater degrees of deregulation 
within the mining industry, including the area of safety.
Once again, in a climate of economic recession and conservative politics, 
the time is ripe for an erosion of the role of trade unions at the workplace. 
For our part, the United Mine Workers remains absolutely resolute in 
overcoming this threat.
The tragic lessons of the past have shown us that there is no room for 
compromise where issues of safety are concerned.
Don Dingsdag's book vividly illustrates the validity of our position.
Tony Wilks
General Secretary 
United Mine Workers 
Sydney, New South Wales 
July, 1993
INTRODUCTION
The importance of learning from the past is demonstrated in this book by 
Don Dingsdag about the Bulli mining disaster of 1887.
The theme of the book will be of interest to miners in particular and 
workers in general. W hile the story of the Bulli disaster will be highly 
relevant to students of Australian labour history, it also has implications 
for students studying education, industrial relations, occupational health 
and safety, politics and sociology.
The Bulli disaster clearly illustrates that people frequently disregard the 
lessons of history. In his analysis of the inquiry which followed the 
tragedy at Bulli, Don Dingsdag details the role of the state in that inquiry 
process. The specific role of the government of the day in the enactment 
o f coalmining legislation provides a fascinating glimpse into N.S.W. 
politics in the late 1880s. The tasks of the colliery and government 
officials are also described in this treatment of the Bulli disaster.
Don Dingsdag's examination of issues relating to safety within the 
coalmining industry is pertinent given the increased focus on safety in 
industry in today's world. In the 1880s, however, coal mining legislation 
was vague and imprecise with too many 'let out' clauses. Phrases such as 
'whenever deemed necessary', 'within a reasonable time' and 'as far as 
practicable' appear often in the legislation and these phrases provide a 
clue to the causes of the 1887 disaster.
History has shown us that the rigid adherence to the principle of payment 
strictly by result can have dire consequences, especially in high risk 
industries. Don Dingsdag sees this principle as a factor in the many 
unsafe practices which flourished in nineteenth century coalmining where 
injuries and death were common occurrences.
The investigation of the enforcement of coalmining legislation and the 
role of the N.S.W. Department of Mines in the process provides examples
of industry practices in the 1880s. The influence of Government in the 
coalmining industry at that time was mainly confined to the regulatory 
function of the Department of Mines and its inspectorate. Thus, the work 
of inspectors and the impact of their performance had profound effects in 
N.S.W. coalmines. There were never enough inspectors and coalmining 
legislation was imprecise in its content and inconsistent in its application. 
When combined, these factors created a recipe for disaster.
The relationship between government and private enterprise is also an 
issue covered in Don Dingsdag's book. The Bulli mining disaster shows 
that a fundamental element in developing an understanding of the nature 
of official inquiries into coalmining accidents in the coalmining industry 
of N.S.W. during the nineteenth century is the phenomenon of the 
interlocking of economic and political interests. The investigation 
surrounding the Bulli disaster reveals that parliamentarians and business 
people held common interests, a situation which may well have 
influenced safety issues. The events at Bulli also highlight the potential 
problems that can arise with close relationship between government and 
private enterprise.
In the instance of the Bulli disaster, the Government's response to the 
inquest verdict was to appoint a Royal Commission composed of 
Commissioners who appeared to have been biased in favour of the 
Government and the Bulli Coal Mining Company. The Government was 
able to arrange these favourable conditions by virtue of the powers vested 
in Cabinet to call for a Royal Commission, to choose its terms of 
reference and to select its Commissioners.
In his description of the social relations of production in nineteenth 
century coalmining in N.S.W., Don Dingsdag reveals both an 
unconscious and sometimes intentional disregard for safety by nearly all 
those involved with the industry. He suggests that an economic rationale 
frequently eroded any serious consideration of the issue of safety. The 
manner in which the coalmining legislation had been framed and the 
ineffectual way it was enforced also contributed to the disregard of safety.
The inadequacy o f the investigative processes into mining disasters can 
also be seen as a contributing factor to the lack of success by 
governments in preventing major mine accidents in the twentieth century 
despite improvements in technology and safety legislation since the early 
1900s.
The concentration by Don Dingsdag on selected responses to a single 
event in an historical perspective succinctly highlights the influence of 
the political and economic ideologies which pervaded the N.S.W. coal 
mining industry in the latter parts of the last century.
As a lesson from the past, the terrible calamity at Bulli begs the question 
’how could the Mt. Kembla disaster happen just a few short years after 
Bulli?'. This book provides a lesson from the past as Australia 
approaches the close of another century. Whether this lesson is heeded 
will depend on the responses of all people who are prepared to become 
active participants in shaping the future.
Once one has read Don Dingsdag's account of the Bulli disaster, the role 
that education can play in the process of making mining a safer working 
environment and making people more aware of the importance of safety 
issues in industry is evident.
This book can play an important role in an educative process aimed at 
enhancing working conditions in the mining industry. Teachers, miners, 
company directors, trade unionists, Members of Parliament and members 
of the wider society all have a role to play in this educative process.
Michael M Berrell
Faculty of Education 
University of Southern Queensland 
July, 1993
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CHAPTER ONE 
1 The Bulli Mining Disaster: an Introduction
On Wednesday, 23 March 1887, at 2.30 p.m. an explosion 
occurred at the Bulli Colliery in New South Wales (N.S.W.), Australia 
which resulted in the deaths of 81 men and boys. At the time this was 
Australia's largest coalmine disaster and today remains the second worst 
mine related disaster in Australian history. Together with the 1902 
Mount Kembla mine tragedy in which 96 miners perished, these events 
remind us of the dangers faced by miners as a part of their working day.
The force of the explosion at Bulli, magnified by the presence of 
coaldust [1], was restricted to a small section of the mine and killed 
instantly those miners who worked in close proximity to the site of the 
blast. Those who survived the initial force of the explosion died from the 
effects of asphyxiant afterdamp, a poisonous mixture of gases nearly 
always encountered after a coalmine explosion. Immediately after the 
initial explosion several heroic rescue parties entered the mine. These 
men undertook this rescue task not knowing if there were any survivors or 
if successive explosions would cause the mine to collapse. The full 
horror of the tragedy began to unfold when the disfigured bodies of the 
miners were brought to the surface. This occurred amidst the panic and 
anxiety o f the miners' next-of-kin who by that time had assembled at the 
mine. The immensity of the disaster presented several problems for the 
Bulli community. In terms of health problems, there were no adequate 
mortuary facilities available. In addition, the lack of government 
sponsored social services in the nineteenth century meant that either the 
private sector or the community would have to provide for the widows 
and dependents of the deceased miners. The importance of these social 
service and health issues are alluded to in the secondary title of the book, 
lessons from  the past. They are treated in a general manner in the 
conclusion. In the light of these lessons from the past there is a pressing 
need today to examine these aspects of coalmining life.
Until recently the body of historical literature on Australian 
coalmine disasters was an under-represented field of study [2], Issues
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pertaining to rescue and charitable relief operations as well as the grief 
such coalmining communities experienced after disasters of the 
magnitude of Bulli have been discussed in orthodox studies of disasters. 
The focus of this book is a hitherto almost neglected area of Australian 
historiography, that of the official inquiry into coalmining accidents - 
more precisely, it is an investigation into the role of the state in this area. 
Another purpose is to examine the process of one other significant sphere 
of government activity, the enactment of coal mining legislation in 
Parliament. The book also investigates the role of the most significant 
government department in the N.S.W. coal mining industry during the 
nineteenth century, the Department of Mines.
This wider investigation of government activity is motivated by 
the response of the N.S.W. Government to the Bulli disaster as well as the 
reactions of the Bulli Coal Mining Company and the Department of 
Mines inspectorate. To a lesser extent, the book also investigates the 
actions of the miners and their union, the Illawarra Miners' Mutual 
Protective Association (IMMPA). The explosion at the Bulli mine was 
first investigated by a mandatory inquest which exonerated the miners 
and found against both the Government and the Bulli Coal Mining 
Company. If the inquest verdict would have been left unchallenged, the 
Government would have been embarrassed by evidence which clearly 
pointed to the incompetence of officials within the Department of Mines 
and the exposure of the ineffectiveness of the 1876 Coal Mines 
Regulation Act (CMRA). The parliamentary processes that produced such 
weak legislation would also have come under close scrutiny. An 
uncontested finding would also have resulted in a hefty financial liability 
and the probable financial ruin of the Bulli Coal Mining Company.
The Government's response to the inquest verdict was to appoint 
a Royal Commission which made a report (Bulli Colliery Accident, 
Report o f  Royal Commission; together with the minutes o f  evidence and 
appendices, hereafter referred to as 'the Royal Commission' or 'the 
Commission') composed of commissioners who were biased in favour of 
the Government and the Bulli Coal Mining Company. The Government 
was able to arrange these favourable conditions by virtue of the powers 
vested in cabinet to call for Royal Commissions and to choose the 
Commission's terms of reference and composition. The Cabinet of the
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Parkes' administration in N.S.W. in 1887, replete with coalmine 
proprietors, was aided in this process by both houses o f parliament, which 
were also over represented by men who held coalmining interests or who 
were sympathetic toward the industry. This set of interlocking 
relationships between coalmine owners and parliament is the mainspring 
of the wider investigation of this book, viz, the role of government in 
nineteenth century coalmining in N.S.W. There are clearly lessons to be 
learned from the past from this historical investigation.
Government functions are numerous and complex. However, 
the totality of government instrumentalities involved in the coalmining 
industry of N.S.W. for the larger part of the nineteenth century is beyond 
the scope of this book. The diversity of government participation and 
influence in the coalmining industry discussed here is not complete. 
Aside from passing only four coalmining acts during the nineteenth 
century, government involvement in the coalmining industry was mainly 
confined to the administration of legislation which was delegated to the 
Department of Mines and its inspectorate. The actions of this department 
and its inspectorate had a profound impact on the Bulli disaster.
It will be shown below that the other functions of the 
Department of Mines, which included survey work, also held implications 
for the Bulli disaster. In a broader context, unsafe mining practices 
elsewhere in the Colony were also affected by this moribund department. 
As well, the other branches of government including those responsible for 
public schooling and health, influenced the daily lives of both coalmining 
families and employers. The pervasiveness of government was felt by 
company officials and miners alike who were directly affected by 
government in many ways. Managers who in some instances were also 
magistrates adjudicated over breaches of the Coal Mines Regulation Act 
by either workers or in some cases fellow managers. The partisanship of 
the relationship between government and employers was such that miners 
could be charged by managers under the Act for swearing at work.
W hile the influence of government was pervasive, this book 
identifies a lack of government conviction in the pursuit o f investigations 
into the ways in which coalmine owners operated their mines. The 
terrible calamity at Bulli is indicative of the biased relationship which 
existed between coalmine owners and government. The fact that
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governments did not act decisively to make coalmines safer until 1912 
when the Coal Mines Regulation Act was introduced raises the question 
of the extent o f collusion between government and private enterprise, 
especially during the latter part of the nineteenth century. The 
inadequacy of the investigative process into the causes of mining 
disasters can also be seen as a contributing factor to the appalling record 
of governments in preventing major mine accidents in the twentieth 
century despite improvements in technology and the introduction of new 
legislation since the early 1900s. Accordingly, the major theme of this 
book is an analysis of the official responses to the Bulli disaster and the 
lessons that major mining accidents provide for contemporary society. 
The social, political and economic history of Bulli is mentioned in those 
instances where the information illuminates the process of official 
inquiry.
W hile research has been conducted into some aspects of the 
coalmining industry during the nineteenth century, for the purpose of the 
argument developed here, such research is either too general or too 
narrow in its application in the context of the approach taken in this book. 
For those who wish to pursue a more general treatment of coalmining, M.
H. Ellis' A Saga o f  Coal [3] describes the development of the northern 
coalfields of N.S.W.. This work provides a non-scientific and sometimes 
biased view of the formative years of the Newcastle-Wallsend Coal 
Company and the company's reaction to the development of unionism in 
the Newcastle district. Ellis tends to ignore the role of government in 
matters of safety and the book can be interpreted as an apology for the 
company's role in the highly competitive embryonic stages of the N.S.W. 
coalmining industry. Ellis neither discusses the Bulli disaster in depth 
nor the general implications of government activity for either society at 
large or the coalmining industry. Some researchers, however, do refer to 
the Bulli disaster and indicate the need for greater government 
intervention in the regulation of coalmining safety. Robin Gollan's The 
Coalminers o f  New South Wales [4], for example, analysed the Bulli 
disaster, but did not come to grips fully with the problems associated with 
the official inquiries into the disaster. Gollan was predominantly 
concerned with the development of unionism in the coalmining industry. 
However, Gollan was very critical of the parliamentary machinations
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which delayed the enactment of a new CMRA which was introduced in 
1887 but not enacted until 1896. In A History o f  the M iners' Federation 
o f Australia [5] E. Ross was mainly concerned with the struggle of 
unionism in the coalfields. Nevertheless, he referred to the Bulli disaster 
and deplored the neglect of safety requirements by governments. A more 
recent work by Stuart Piggin and Henry Lee, The M t Kembla Disaster [6], 
fills the gap in the literature cited above. A significant portion of this 
book is devoted to the legal, industrial and political responses to the Mt. 
Kembla disaster. As with the Bulli disaster fifteen years earlier, the 
aftermath of the Mt. Kembla disaster produced similar outcomes. After 
several lengthy inquiries, including a Royal Commission which 
recommended extensive changes to coalmining legislation, the blame for 
the explosion at Mt. Kembla (as in the case of Bulli) was put down to the 
carelessness of workers rather than a lack of purpose by government, 
mine owners, managers and officials in enforcing the CMRA [7]. A focus 
on official responses to the Bulli disaster highlights the influence of 
political and economic thought of the time. By placing the responses to 
Bulli in an historical perspective, the verdict of the inquest held to 
investigate the Bulli Colliery explosion can be seen to have been 
subverted by the subsequent Bulli Royal Commission established by the 
Parkes Government.
A fundamental element in understanding the nature of the 
subversion of the original inquest is the interlocking of economic and 
political interests in the coalmining industry of N.S.W. during the 
nineteenth century. There were already many problems inherent in 
nineteenth century coalmining legislation due to the influence of 
parliamentary coalmine owners long before the Bulli explosion of 1887. 
By the late 1880s coalmine owners and other men of property were well 
entrenched in the N.S.W. Parliament. In fact, this association was well 
established before the Colony was made self-governing in 1856. It is not 
entirely surprising that only men of wealth were members o f Parliament. 
There were restrictive property qualifications which prevented working 
men from being elected or appointed to the Legislative Council. When 
the entirely elected Legislative Assembly came into being in 1856 only 
two working men could afford to enter Parliament until 1891 after 
payment for parliamentarians was legislated. Consequently, before 1891
5
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the framing of coalmining legislation occurred in parliaments which 
consisted of members who were involved financially in coalmining to 
various degrees. Some parliamentarians were coalmine owners while 
others had interests in allied industries such as gasmaking, foundries and 
shipping, all of which were dependent on coal as a source of fuel as well 
as income. This is not to suggest that Parliament or its members were 
corrupt. However, when decisions or laws were made which affected 
their business concerns such decisions would have been influenced by 
personal considerations even though members often claimed to the 
contrary. Notwithstanding, this is not to imply that there was something 
sinister or conspiratorial about the coalmine proprietors, landowners, or 
lawyers who dominated Parliament. Rather, their prominence in 
Parliament was the result of political and social structures which existed 
in the era before self-government and became a norm of society in 
N.S.W. after 1856.
W hether the vagueness ;md imprecise nature of coalmining 
legislation was intentional, the fact remains that there were many 'let out' 
Clauses in the legislation. Clauses such as 'whenever deemed necessary', 
'within a reasonable time' and 'as far as practicable' seem to suggest that 
coalmine owners placed private gain before public good. Owing to the 
imprecise nature of legislation, Department of Mines inspectors were 
often incapable of enforcing the law. To complicate matters further there 
were not enough inspectors. Colliery and government officials were not 
alone in their dereliction of duly. A review of nineteenth century 
legislation presented in Chapter Seven reveals that the disregard for 
safety by managers and others at the workplace was both intentional and 
unintentional. This lack of concern for safety issues was accepted as 
normal.
The 1854 Coal Mines Act was the first piece of legislation to 
address coalmining safety. This legislation dealt only with the 
registration and inspection of coalmines [8], For example, no section was 
explicitly devoted to safety regulations, neither did the act forbid the 
employment of women or very young children. Sometimes children were 
employed in N.S.W. coalmines [9]. The 1854 Act caused coalmine 
proprietors little concern. The Act's only mandatory requirement was that 
owners supplied the examiner of coal mines with copies of their colliery's
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plans. The examiner's duties included the role of chief inspector, assayer 
and surveyor. Under the Act, no other inspector was appointed and 
consequently part of the examiner's brief was to inspect regularly all of 
N.S.W.'s collieries which increased from 12 in 1854 to 18 in 1861. 
However, m ost of the examiner's time was taken advising the government 
on the valuation of all minerals [10]. Consequently, there was little 
chance that the examiner could inspect all of the Colony's collieries, even 
on an irregular basis. The 1862 Coal Fields Regulation Act made several 
improvements but fell far short of making mines safer. It expressly 
prohibited the employment of persons under 13 years of age and women 
of any age. The Act's major stipulations included the reporting of 
accidents; the provision of two egresses or exits in every mine, a less than 
satisfactory definition of 'adequate' ventilation; the fencing off of 
dangerous sections; the locking of safety lamps; regulations for steam- 
engines and boilers; the establishment of Special Rules which governed 
safety at individual mines; a comprehensive schedule of penalties; and 
specific but limited powers for inspectors and the examiner of coalfields. 
The Act appeared to be an impressive piece of legislation but in reality it 
proved to be a paper tiger.
The momentum for a new act had come from the recently 
reformed Northern (Newcastle) district miners' union which soon after its 
establishment in May 1860 sent a petition to Parliament calling for an 
improvement in legislation. The failure to obtain a suitable response to 
its petition for improved ventilation and other demands prompted the 
union to nominate a miner, Thomas Lewis, for the Northumberland 
electorate in the 1860 general election [11], Lewis, who had been very 
active in the establishment of the union, was initially responsible for the 
introduction of the 1862 Act in Parliament. As the first and only working 
man in N.S.W. parliament, Lewis was probably not a frequent speaker but 
he nevertheless persuaded the Premier to introduce the Bill [12], 
Subsequently, he resigned his seat in 1862 when he became one of the 
three Department of Mines Coal Fields Branch inspectors. From 1864 
until 1881 he was the only inspector for the entire Colony.
The parliamentary coalmine owners who ensured a tortuous 
passage of subsequent legislation were already well established in 
Parliament which gave them the opportunity to moderate the more
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demanding Clauses of the 1862 Bill. Major opposition to the Bill came in 
particular from the Legislative Council which had a small but influential 
nucleus of coalmine owners as members. However, there is a problem if 
Parliament is seen as only the hand-maiden of private enterprise [131. If 
it always performs functions biased in favour of private enterprise, how 
did this legislation get beyond its first reading? For that matter, how was 
the legislation introduced initially? A plausible explanation is that not all 
parliamentarians were ill-disposed towards legislation of this kind. The
1862 Bill became a political football for reasons other than the 
machinations o f parliamentary coalmine owners. The relationship 
between private enterprise and parliament is far more problematic and 
complex than simple explanations which suggest a permanent collusion 
between the two sectors. Despite a conservative element in the N.S.W. 
Parliament and members with direct involvement in the coalmining 
industry, the prevailing philosophy from the early 1860s to the late 1880s 
was liberal in character. Charles Cowper, the liberals' leader in his third 
term as Premier, introduced the Coal Fields Regulation Bill in 1861. 
However, because of the wrangle with the Legislative Council over the 
Robertson Land Acts the Council rejected several important pieces of 
legislation [14]. Cowper reintroduced the Bill in the next session, and 
after its failure to reach the Council, reintroduced it again in 1862. It was 
then referred to a Select Committee, drastically amended and finally 
passed in late 1862.
The composition of die Select Committee provides a prime 
example of political abuse and cynicism. Of its seven members, four had 
direct interests in coalmining. Bourn Russell and James Mitchell were 
both Newcastle mine owners and Francis Merewether was the 
superintendent of the Australian Agricultural Company's (AACo) 
coalmines as well as being Mitchell's son-in-law. Charles Kemp, the 
Committee Chairman, was also the Newcastle Wallsend Coal Mining 
Company chairman, a director of two steamship companies and the 
director of the Australian Gas Light Company [15]. A major objection to 
the Bill was that the original provision compelled owners to deposit mine 
plans with government authorities. Parliamentarians in both houses 
argued vehemently against this 'invasion of privacy' which according to 
their reasoning, would enable competitors to view plans and gain an
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economic advantage. Of course, the depositing of plans was a sensible 
safety precaution and in the event of a serious accident this requirement 
would assist in any rescue operations.
With legislation in place, the next step for government was to 
undertake the administration of the law. Under Cowper's premiership the 
Coal Fields Branch briefly flourished, becoming a semi-autonomous 
branch within the Department of Lands with William Keene the examiner 
as its head. Cowper expanded the Coal Fields Branch by appointing three 
additional inspectors and an examiner for the Illawarra district. The latter 
position was taken up by John Mackenzie, a colliery viewer (overseer) 
and mining engineer, who was heavily implicated in the Bulli disaster. 
Curiously, as a witness at the 1862 Select Committee, Mackenzie denied 
the need for examiners or inspectors and vigorously attacked most of the 
Bill's provisions [16]. Nevertheless, Mackenzie was appointed in early
1863 and it appears that he had overcome his objections in the light of his 
salary which was £400 per annum. Thomas Lewis was one of the 
inspectors [17] appointed after he was forced to vacate his seat in 
Parliament. Because there was no payment for Members of Parliament, 
Lewis was supported by a levy of the northern union membership. 
However, in 1861 at the instigation of the AACo, the northern coalmine 
owners formed a loose association, the actions of which caused the 
disintegration of the district union in 1862. Accordingly Lewis' source of 
income disappeared. He resigned his seat and accepted the £300 p.a. 
inspector's appointment. The expansion of the Coal Fields Branch was 
cut short in 1863 when James Martin, Cowper's former ally but now his 
political enemy, became Premier of N.S.W.. Under the Martin 
administration two positions of inspector were abolished in June 1864. 
Besides Lewis, Mackenzie remained until August 1865 when he resigned 
his position. From that time until 1883 the Coal Fields Branch had only 
two field operatives even though the number of mines in N.S.W. more 
than doubled from 24 to 51 during that period.
Little is known of the early activities of the Coal Fields Branch, 
especially its most important function - the inspection of mines. Yet, 
from the earliest published Department o f  Mines Annual Reports, it is 
painfully obvious that Lewis could not inspect every mine. In addition to 
being an inspector of mines he was required to investigate serious
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accidents and to be present at coroners' inquests when deaths occurred in 
coalmines. Lewis' workload was not lightened by Keene the examiner. 
Keene not only performed the field duties of assaying minerals but was 
also the principal administrator. Consequently, Lewis was left to inspect 
all the mines. The situation worsened when Keene resigned in 1873 and 
was replaced by Mackenzie, the former examiner of coal fields for the 
Illawarra. Mackenzie steadfastly refused to inspect mines because he felt 
it was beneath the dignity of his 'high' position [18].
The lack of mine inspections did not improve under the auspices 
of the 1876 Coal Mines Regulation Act which had repealed the 1862 Act. 
In fact, as the number of mines increased under Lewis' term of office to 
more than 40, the enforcement of the 1876 CMRA became almost 
impossible. Lewis' successor, James Rowan, was supposed to inspect 
more than 50 mines until 1883 when another inspector, John Dixon, was 
appointed. In 1887 Rowan and Dixon were joined by Thomas Bates. 
From 1874 until 1895 the fractious Mackenzie remained the head of the 
Coal Fields Branch. From 1874, Mackenzie was responsible directly to 
the Under Secretary for Mines who was the permanent head responsible 
only to the Secretary for Mines who was also Minister for Lands.
The Coal Fields Branch under Mackenzie had a questionable 
attitude to the reporting of accidents, but its performance in accident 
prevention and safety was reprehensible. This was in part due to not only 
the ineffectiveness of the 1876 Act but also to the lack of zeal on the part 
o f Mackenzie and the inspectorate. The feeble nature of the Act 
originated with its tortuous passage through the Parliament. Originally 
introduced as an amendment to the 1862 Act, it lapsed in the Legislative 
Council in 1865-66. In 1873 following the 1873 Select Committee [19] a 
new Coal Mines Regulation Bill was introduced and suspended while the 
two legislative chambers deliberated its enactment. It was finally passed 
in 1876 [20]. It is possible that these delays were a direct result of 
deliberate tactics by those Members of Parliament who may have stood to 
lose financially. Not only were those interested parties successful in 
delaying the implementation of legislation but they also succeeded in 
watering down the legislation during its passage through Parliament.
10
Bulli mining disaster 1887
N.S.W. Parliament and the Coalmine Owners
A pivotal argument of this book is that the Bulli Royal 
Commission was intentionally tilled with members who would counteract 
the verdict o f the inquest. The bias of the jurors at the inquest held at 
Bulli, who were embittered by the tragedy, had incriminated the company 
and the Department of Mines. The Government was embarrassed by the 
press of the day and had created the Royal Commission in that context. 
The Government chose its members and determined its terms of 
reference. With its parliamentary connections, the Bulli Coal Mining 
Company aided the Government in this design in order to avoid monetary 
and judicial retribution. Ostensibly, the Royal Commission had been 
fashioned to inquire into the cause of the explosion at the Bulli mine and 
to make recommendations that would contribute to a general 
improvement of ventilation and safety precautions for the mining industry 
as a whole. However, in reality a laissez-faire attitude towards the 
improvement of safety regulations prevailed in parliamentary circles.
The interlocking of economic interests in the N.S.W. Parliament 
had a significant influence during the course of the Commission. This 
factor also had an impact on the outcome. In 1887, the N.S.W. 
Parliament was teeming with members who would have suffered a 
financial loss if prohibitive safety measures were introduced by 
legislation as a result of the recommendations made by the Commission. 
Regardless o f the many escape Clauses in the report, costs would have 
escalated inordinately if additional supervisory staff, expensive drilling of 
extra ventilation shafts and anti-coaldust equipment had to be introduced 
to meet the requirements of CMRA.
An investigation [21] of the financial interests of N.S.W. 
parliamentarians in 1887 revealed that at least 22 Legislative Councillors 
were directors or owners of coalmines. A further three members had 
extensive interests in associated companies, mainly the steamship lines. 
At least 25 of the Legislative Assembly's 124 members were directors or 
owners of coalmines and two members were directors of steam 
navigation companies. In this light, the Ministry or Cabinet which 
housed the ultimate power of state, can be viewed as the epitome of 
interlocking economic and oolitical interests.
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The Parkes Ministry consisted of ten ministers, of whom seven 
were directors or proprietors of coalmines. These people included Sir 
Henry Parkes, the Premier and Colonial Secretary who owned 4,000 acres 
of coalmine leases at Jamberoo; Mr John Fitzgerald Bums, Colonial 
Treasurer and Director of unspecified coalmine companies; and Mr 
Thomas Garrett, Secretary for Lands and owner of 68,000 acres of 
mineral leases who was also Chairman and Director of several other 
coalmining companies. Others of influence included Mr John Sutherland, 
Secretary of Public Works and a partner of Sir Henry Parkes at Jamberoo; 
Mr James Inglis, Minister of Public Instruction who was also Chairman 
of the Sydney Harbour Collieries; and Mr Charles James Roberts, 
Postmaster General and Director of unspecified coalmining concerns. Mr 
James Nixon Brunker, who became Secretary of Lands after Thomas 
Garrett, was also a director of several coalmining companies.
The Ministry listed the Commissioners, chose the Commission's 
chairman, and gave these people the terms of reference which, arguably, 
guaranteed a favourable outcome. With these appointments, vested 
interests were able to locate the blame with the miners. The miner 
provided a convenient victim, as he had neither the political nor legal 
avenues at his disposal to counter the attack of the parliamentarian cum 
coalmine owner.
This reciprocal relationship between government and private 
interests holds true for all coalmining companies investigated in this 
paper. For example, in 1862, George Wigram Allen, who was elected to 
the Legislative Council in 1860, appeared as the solicitor before 
Parliament in the incorporation of the Bulli Coal Mining Company [22], 
At the same time, the Osborne Wallsend Company, also represented by 
Allen, was incorporated. Before the same Parliamentary Select 
Committee, William Speer appeared as director for both companies and 
the only witness. Speer was later to become the member for West Sydney 
in 1869. Parliamentary connections would prove extremely useful for 
these companies in gaining concessions for private railways, harbours and 
jetties [23], Although the now knighted Allen resigned from the N.S.W. 
Assembly in 1883 and had died a few years prior to the Bulli disaster, the 
business connections he had made during his 15 years of Parliamentary 
service would have been exceedingly useful to his beneficiaries who
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retained a large share in the Bulli Company in 1887. Sir George Allen 
was Managing Director o f the Bulli Coal Mining Company until 1885, his 
father George Allen, Chairman of Committees of the Legislative Council 
1856-73, also served as a Director on the board. The family connection 
also enhanced Sir George Allen's eligibility as a director of companies in 
associated industries. He served as director of many steamship and 
mining companies as well as the Australian Gaslight Company [24], and 
benefited financially from these directorships. The family legal business 
of Allen, Allen and Bowden consisted of father and son and a cousin and 
acted for most of the above mentioned companies, including the Bulli 
Coal Mining Company. Sir George Allen's personal annual income was 
estimated to be some £15,000 in 1876 [25], and the extent of his 
parliamentary influence was such that Sir Henry Parkes was indebted to 
him on several occasions [26], borrowing £9,000 from him on one 
occasion [27].
At a local level the Allen family concern was able to exert a 
powerful economic influence on the north Illawarra District. Just to the 
north of the Bulli mine, Sir George owned a large acreage of mining 
freehold known as the North Illawarra Coal Mining Company [28], The 
towns of Austinmer and Coledale, some 16 kilometres north of Bulli, owe 
the naming o f several localities to the Allen family - Allen Park, Allen 
Street and Wigram Road in Austinmer are obvious reminders of the 
family's influence. Less obvious are Toxteth Avenue, Austinmer which 
was named after Sir George's residence in Glebe, an inner suburb of 
Sydney. Boyce Avenue in Austinmer was so named in honour of his 
wife's maiden name. The naming of Hemsley Place in Coledale was 
derived from the partner who joined the family firm in 1894. The name 
Allen, Allen and Bowden was changed to Allen, Allen and Hemsley, and 
this group subsequently became the legal counsel for E. Vickery [29],
Mr Ebenezer Vickery M.L.C., the owner of several coalmining 
companies in the Illawarra district, was also a director of the Bulli Coal 
Mining company by 1887. Mr E. Vickery, Mr George Alfred Lloyd, 
M.L.C., Director of the Bulli Company and Mr George Hamilton, the 
company’s Secretary, in their capacity as administrators of the Bulli 
Relief Fund established to care for the families of the deceased miners, 
had dissuaded the widows and legatees from instigating proceedings
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against the company for damages [30], The miners' beneficiaries were 
entitled under the Employers' Liability Act o f  1886, to three years of 
estimated earnings [31]. Vickery, Lloyd and Hamilton, undoubtedly 
worried about the company's financial losses during the preceding half 
yearly trading period, assured the widows that they would be maintained 
adequately by the Bulli Relief Fund [32]. Litigation by the miners' 
beneficiaries, based on a three yearly average per person employed in the 
same industry and district, would have threatened the company's 
economic viability. The earning capacity of miners in the district would 
have averaged between £1-15-0 and to £1-19-0 per week [33]. The 
majority of the 81 victims were miners while 20 or so were 'off-hand' or 
auxiliary workers earning an estimated £1 per week. The costs to the 
company would have been considerable if the earning capacity of the 
deceased men was taken into account. An estimate of the costs can be 
made by calculating the total of 20 wages at £1-0-0 per week and 60 
wages at £1-15-0. The action against the company would have amounted 
to nearly £20,000, a sum greater than the company had earned in profits.
The subversion of the inquest verdict became important for these 
reasons, not only for the Government of the day, but also for the 
company. The judgement of the Royal Commission created at the behest 
of a Parliament which included the proprietors of several coalmines 
including the Bulli Coal Mining Company, exonerated the Government 
and the company and implicated the miners as causal agents in the 
disaster that struck Bulli on the afternoon of Wednesday, 23 March, 1887.
Notwithstanding misgivings about inappropriate parliamentary 
behaviour, the events after Bulli show the customary influence exerted by 
parliamentary coalmine owners extended beyond the legislative process. 
The influence of political and economic interests also had far reaching 
implications for the Bulli disaster. The 1887 Cabinet of the N.S.W. 
Government, for example, had arranged the composition of the 
membership of the Commission established to investigate the disaster. 
This may have been done to produce a favourable outcome. The 
Australian political economist and social historian Ted Wheelwright aptly 
summarised the implications of interlocking directorships thus:
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(c)lose links between business and government can become 
scandalously close, and Australian political history is replete 
with incidents where business firms or wealthy individuals have 
used their political connections to direct personal advantage 
[34],
Eventually the intervention of the coalmining interests in 
Parliament in the passage of the 1876 CMRA may well have contributed 
to the events at Bulli on that fatal Wednesday in 1887. The 
ineffectiveness of the Act meant that an explosion of the magnitude of 
Bulli was perhaps inevitable. The weakness of the Act was aggravated by 
the understaffed Department of Mines Coalfields Branch inspectorate 
which was represented by some negligent officers. Yet, history records 
that the Commission's judgement effectively exonerated not only 
Department of Mines officials but also the Bulli Coal Mining Company.
J. D. Holmes, in the Australian Law Journal, suggested that 
Royal Commissions are the best method by which to obtain information 
[35]. However, the manner of appointment of the members to the
Commission and the outcomes of their deliberations suggest that:
■£)
Royal Commissions may be granted for political ends to persons 
unworthy of compliments - they may be made the instruments of 
impertinent interference... [36],
The Bulli Royal Commission was an instance of 'power abused, of 
essential and beneficial prerogatives perverted to serve a sinister object' 
[37],
Format of this Book
Chapter One serves as a general introduction of the main themes 
developed in Uiis book. After briefly outlining the immediate events after 
the Bulli disaster the chapter addresses the implications of the failure of 
the official inquiries into the Bulli disaster to resolve the safety breaches 
that precipitated the disaster. More generally, this chapter examines the 
role of government in the enactment and the maintenance of coalmining 
legislation. Chapter Two deals with the background and development of 
Bulli in the context of the economic interaction between the township and 
the Bulli Coal Mining Company. The phenomenon of the interlocking of
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economic and political interests is also scrutinised in this chapter. In 
Chapter Three, details of events preceding the inquest held to investigate 
the explosion, the selection of jurors, their prejudices and their verdict are 
discussed. The proceedings of the inquest are, however, not treated in 
depth. The implications of the biased verdict directed against the 
Department of Mines and the Bulli Coal Mining Company are seen as 
being worthy of more intensive comment. Chapter Four deals with the 
Parkes Government's need to create the Commission in order to 
counteract the inquest verdict. The Commissioners are seen as the agents 
of a Parliament intent on securing a favourable verdict for its coalmining 
members. Chapter Five scrutinises the sittings of the Commission and 
demonstrates that it was prejudiced in favour of the Department of Mines 
and the Bulli Coal Mining Company.
In Chapter Six, the weakness of the 1876 CMRA, the 
effectiveness of the judgements of its administrators and their possible 
collusion with the Bulli Coal Mining Company are discussed. Special 
attention is also given to the examiner, Mr John Mackenzie, who held the 
position of head of the Coal Fields Branch of the Department of Mines. 
He alone attributed the explosion at Bulli to sabotage by dynamite. This 
accusation, directed at miners, was clearly a ruse and not even the biased 
members of the Commission gave credence to his flight of fancy. 
Sections of this chapter are devoted to a disclosure of Mackenzie's 
financial and political connections because in many ways Mackenzie 
represented the Coalfields Branch and was one of its important policy­
makers. An investigation of the role of the Department of Mines is also 
undertaken.
The final chapter examines the Bulli disaster in the context of 
the present. It is suggested that history could and should provide valuable 
lessons from the past, but in fact such lessons are largely ignored. It is 
also implied that more attention should be accorded by the historian to the 
area of policy-making and administration of government instrumentalities 
and departments for it is within this area that a safer coalmining industry 
can be developed. Also, Royal Commissions in general should not be 
seen as being alternatives to judicial inquiries in those cases where the 
latter are a duly warranted option for redress.
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CHAPTER TWO 
2 Background and Development of Bulli 
Safety in Nineteenth Century Coalmines.
Across the bargaining tables of power, the bureaucracies of 
business and government face one another, and under the tables 
their myriad feet are interlocked in wonderfully complex ways 
(C. W right Mills, 1951:79)
Bulli lies 68 kilometres south of Sydney, N.S.W. and 13 
kilometres north of the industrial city of Wollongong. It is located on the 
narrow coastal plain between the escarpment of the Illawarra Ranges and 
the Pacific Ocean. The ranges meet the sea at Coalcliff and recede about
1.75 kilometres inland at Bulli and approximately 3.5 kilometres at Mt. 
Keira. The average elevation is 300 metres. The ranges are heavily 
forested and contain eight coal seams separated by several beds of shale, 
sandstone and igneous rocks.
The coal seams of the Illawarra district are part o f the Sydney 
Basin. While the seams are too deep in the Sydney area for mining to be 
a viable economic proposition, the seams are closer to the surface in the 
Illawarra area to the south of Sydney, at Newcastle to the north and 
Lithgow to the west. At Coalcliff, where mining has only recently 
ceased, coal strata are visible five metres above sea level, rising to 150 
metres at Bulli. The coalbed today known as the Bulli Seam was known 
in 1887 as the '8 foot' seam [1] and by the late 1800s this was the easiest 
to work as it contained the thickest and the then most saleable coal 
deposits. Therefore, it was considered to be a most profitable exercise by 
the Bulli Coal Mining Company, despite the fact that the seam was most 
affected by the intrusion of ’rolls' and gas-inducing 'dykes' [2], In the 
Balgownie or '4 foot' seam underlying the Bulli seam, no igneous 
irregularities were encountered and at Bulli this seam was mined without 
the problems that can occur with the presence of gas. The economically 
motivated decision by the Bulli Coal Mining Company to mine the Bulli 
seam in 1884, despite its gaseous nature, was a contributing factor to the
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1887 disaster. The recurring natural cindering, or partial combustion of 
coal reduced the value of the Bulli pit, which was further devalued by the 
1887 explosion. The Bulli Coal Mining Company never seemed to 
recover completely from the financial setback of this explosion. It was 
due to these financial reversals that the mine was sold in 1895 to George 
Adams of Tattersall's fame. It was later to be resold in 1936 to Australian 
Iron and Steel (AIS). It was not until well after World War II that AIS, 
which by then had become part of Broken Hill Pty Ltd (BHP), was 
eventually able to overcome the cindering and variable coal quality 
through the application of modem mining techniques.
Previous to the opening of the Bulli mine in 1863, the wealth of 
the 'North Illawarra' had been generated mainly through agricultural 
production, although the district had originally been a site for cattle 
raising and timber felling. Coal was discovered at Bulli as early as 1828 
but mining was not permitted because of the Australian Agricultural 
Company's monopoly on coalmining [3] which made coalmining other 
than mining for the AACo an illegal activity. In 1848, the AACo's 
monopoly was revoked setting (lie scene for coalmining in the Illawarra 
district, initially at Mt. Keira in 1849. Due to its steam raising capacity, 
Illawarra coal was in high demand in the domestic market for local 
shipping and by 1863 after the opening of the Bulli mine coal began to be 
exported to Shanghai [4],
The high demand for the Bulli Coal Mining Company's coal 
dramatically changed the agricultural and economic character of the Bulli 
settlement. The area's present industrial character began to emerge at this 
time [5], A village of 'substantial huts' appeared which were soon 
replaced by more substantial dwellings. A school and a few shops also 
sprang up near the comp;iny's property [6], The continual growth of the 
company resulted in an increasing demand for miners. With its 
increasing importance as an employer the company was in a position to 
influence the economic character of the area. By 1879, Bulli and the 
adjacent village of Woonona had become largely dependent on the Bulli 
mine [7], The population of the district increased in direct proportion to 
the production of coal, indicating the tremendous influence the mine 
exerted on the surrounding community. The company frequently used its 
economic strength to counteract potential industrial action by its workers
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by threatening to reduce wages or to sack the striking workers. 
Eventually, the company's ability to dominate the labour market had 
direct implications in the causes of the Bulli explosion.
In 1869 the population of Bulli was about 100, yet 90 men from 
Bulli and the immediate district were employed at the Bulli pit producing 
some 64,000 tons per year. Within 12 years there were 645 males in the 
district, 317 o f whom worked at the mine [8] until a major strike/lock-out 
which lasted from September 1886 to March 1887. In that year some 371 
men of an estimated 845 males in the Bulli-Woonona locality were 
employed by the Bulli Coal Mining Company. The strike reduced the 
number to only 177 men [9], The company had also become a major 
landlord for its employees by 1887, and with this development the mine 
management was able to exert an even greater influence over its 
employees. The company was closely identified with the daily life of the 
community.
The fluctuation of coal prices in the Sydney and overseas 
markets frequently led to a reduction in miners' wages and piece-rates 
which resulted in retaliatory strikes by the workers. The 1886-1887 strike 
not only affected the Bulli mine, but also the other Illawarra mines. The 
incident was marked with violence directed at outside miners, 'blacklegs' 
who were brought in by the coal mining companies to defeat the strike. 
Blacklegs were often assaulted and physically prevented from entering 
mines by the striking miners. During the strike, the military were brought 
in and shots were exchanged. As a result of this incident, several Bulli 
miners were prosecuted, fined in court and evicted from company owned 
dwellings. Many were forced to live in makeshift accommodation 110].
The cause of the strike had been the reduction of miners' hewing 
rates on a sliding scale proportionate to the reduction of coal prices. The 
settlement of the strike at Bulli in March 1887 was only achieved by 
forcing the miners to sign engagement rules stipulating reduced piece- 
rates, while at the same time ensuring rigid management control of 
employees. The terms of the settlement eventually became a telling 
factor in the 1887 disaster because miners claimed in evidence before the 
Commission that the strict enforcement of the engagement rules had 
prevented them from reporting the presence of gas [11].
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The emission of gas in the mine was a controversial issue during 
the hearing into the Bulli disaster. The evidence tendered by miners who 
worked continually in gaseous sections of the mine was consistent with 
nineteenth century geological expectations of gas being encountered in 
the Bulli seam [12], Yet, Department o f Mines officials and management 
denied that unsafe quantities of gas were present at Bulli. The 
unexpected striking of several dykes was also a major contributing factor 
in the explosion because of the associated emission of explosive firedamp 
(methane). The discharge of firedamp necessitated additional safety 
procedures which were not observed at the Bulli mine by either 
management, miners, or members of the Department of Mines 
inspectorate.
The colliery had increased output annually until 1884 when a 
large dyke of basalt was struck 1200 metres along the main tunnel from 
the entrance. Because the basalt caused cindering and isolation from the 
coal seam in a northwesterly direction along the main tunnel, another 
tunnel was struck off to the west to avoid the unprofitable mining of 
stone. The new section became known as the 'Western district'. New 
leases were obtained under government land. However, in these new 
leases along the direction of the main tunnel the dyke was struck again. 
With the objective of avoiding the dyke, two parallel tunnels known as 
'headings 1’ and ’2’ were driven at right angles in a northeasterly direction 
to the main tunnel. This section was known as the 'Hill End' or the 'gassy' 
district. As this colloquial name suggests, these and the four subsequent 
headings gave off volatile firedamp, an occurrence which both 
Government and company witnesses attempted to deny during the course 
of the inquest and the Royal Commission.
A contributory factor to the explosion was the inability of the 
mine's inadequate ventilation system to disperse accumulations of gas. 
Alexander Ross, the manager of the Bulli mine, James Rowan, the 
Department of Mines inspector and John Mackenzie the head of the 
Coalfields Branch of the Department, had neglected to provide adequate 
ventilation according to law. Nevertheless, these men remained adamant 
throughout the Commission's sittings that they had indeed observed all 
the safety regulations. The judgement delivered by the Commission
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exonerated these men and attributed the cause of the explosion to a 
reckless miner who had perished in the explosion.
The propensity for health and safety issues to be overlooked in 
N.S.W. coalmining had its roots in the economics of mining and was not 
necessarily the fault of individual company officials or government 
inspectors. Owing to the intermittent nature of the coal trade during the 
nineteenth century, mineworkers, especially those who were paid by 
piece-work - that is, those who were not paid wages but paid by the 
amount of coal they produced, had to take risks to maintain their 
livelihood. From the time of the first effective competition against the 
Australian Agricultural Company's coalmining monopoly in the early 
1840s to the time of writing, the N.S.W. coal industry has possessed the 
potential to produce more coal than could be absorbed by its markets. 
This potential gave rise to an almost continuous problem of under­
employment in the industry until the outbreak of World War II, as well as 
the inherent tendency in the industry to over produce [13]. From the end 
of the AACo's monopoly in 1847 N.S.W. coalmine proprietors operated 
their mines free of governmental regulation in the area of workers' 
compensation until 1900. There were no laws in wage determination 
until 1901 and pricing until 1916. Even by 1900 the only governmental 
constraints on coalmine proprietors consisted of four relatively 
unsubstantial coalmining acts. It can be seen in Chapter One above that 
these acts were carefijlly framed so as not to interfere with the 
profitability of coalmining. Employers' obligations to workers' 
compensation were limited to the flimsy Employers' Liability Acts 
enacted from 1882 and the Miners' Accident Relief Act of 1900, the first 
act specifically concerned with compensation. Consequently, wage 
justice, work conditions and health and safety issues received little or no 
consideration.
This laissez-faire attitude of the N.S.W. Governments during the 
nineteenth century allowed the unfettered development of an industry 
with too many mines and too many men which together constituted the 
roots of excess capacity. Because sailing ships were the mainstay of 
transport for most of the nineteenth century, over-production caused by 
climatic conditions exacerbated the problems of the industry. Stockpiles 
and underemployment were a normal condition of the N.S.W. coalmining
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industry. These conditions placed inordinate pressures on all those 
direcdy concerned with the production of coal to neglect safety factors.
This background of irregular employment also gave rise to a 
pragmatic type of unionism which was almost entirely occupied with 
'bread and butter' issues arising out of necessity. This focus generally 
precluded any organised action over the miners' health and safety. 
Indeed, the individualistic nature of the piece-work system nurtured by 
the unions of the day, fostered a disregard toward health and safety [14], 
By the early 1860s when the Illawarra (Southern) district was established, 
these attitudes were well rooted in the Newcastle district. With the 
expansion of the coal mining industry these traditions were transported to 
the Southern district.
Apart from market fluctuations and price cutting, the 
inefficiency of the Colony’s transport system was the over-riding 
contributor to the tendency for the industry to over produce. Newcastle 
harbour was a dangerous, inaccessible port, Wollongong's harbour was 
too small and the Bulli Coal Mining Company's jetty was frequently 
washed away by big swells. Because Wollongong and Bulli were mainly 
serviced by sail ships during the nineteenth century their harbours were 
often inaccessible especially during heavy winds and adverse tides [15].
The irregular arrivals of ships was as unwelcome to the miners 
as it was to coalmine proprietors. When there were no ships in the 
harbour the stockpiling of coal caused the deterioration of some qualities 
of coal mainly due to spontaneous combustion. Stockpiling also required 
double handling which increased the likelihood of breaking up the coal 
trade preferred 'round' coal which passed over screens with bars 3/4" to 
7/8" (approximately 19 to 22 millimetres) apart. In addition the process 
incurred extra handling costs. To the miners the irregularity of shipping 
meant an indeterminate number of days of long hours followed by an 
equally uncertain period of idleness [16]. Hewers, the miners who 
actually mined the coal, and wheelers, who pushed the skips to and from 
the 'coalface' to the haulage system were generally paid by result. 'Off­
hand' workers, labourers who were paid by the day, were stood down 
when coal was not required.
Consequendy, the customs and practices developed in the 
coalmining industry were largely based on minimising the effects of
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intermittency and optimising their income. These practices originally 
dated from the 1840s in the Northern district where individual 'lodges' 
were formed and a district union was created for a short period in 1854 
and almost permanently from 1861 . However, the development of 
unionism in the Southern district was slower. Coal was discovered in the 
Illawarra in 1797 at Coalcliff, but not mined commercially until 1849 
owing to the AACo's monopoly. From 1849 there was little expansion in 
the Southern district until the 1880s. The number of mines grew from 5 
in 1883 to 10 in 1885 in response to price increases during the prosperous 
1880s. After the slump of the 1890s these prices were not surpassed until 
after World War I. By the turn of the century, of the 100 mines in 
N.S.W., 15 were located in the Illawarra, 64 in the Northern district and 
the remainder in the Western district [17].
While there is evidence of lodges at individual mines in the 
1860s, attempts at district unionism in the Illawarra were unsuccessful 
and after a union was established it was severely decimated by the 
employers. In 1861 the recently reformed Northern union conducted a 
strike and sent delegates [18] to the Illawarra to form a district union; 
however these delegates were rebuffed by the Southern miners. It is not 
clear to what extent the advances of the Northern unionists were resisted 
by the Illawarra miners at the behest of coalmine owners [19]. However, 
there is a significant body of evidence which suggests that the miners 
from then until 1879 rejected incorporation into a district association with 
inter-district connections. This occurred because of the extra money they 
earned when the Northern district was on strike which forced ships to call 
at Illawarra ports. After the IMMPA was formed as a result of a 
successful delegation from the North in 1879, Illawarra miners continued 
to capitalise on the industrial misfortunes of other districts despite 
binding, or at times, less formal arrangements not to do so.
As mentioned above, Bulli harbour and the district's other 
harbours were unprotected from heavy north-easterly swells; their jetties 
were too insubstantial for big tides and were prone to wash away during 
storms. Southern miners' earnings, like their Northern counterparts' were 
heavily dependent on favourable shipping conditions. After the rail 
connection between Wollongong and Sydney was established in 1888 
there was a slight improvement in transport efficiency but an endemic
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shortage of rolling stock prevailed, especially during wheat harvests and 
other peak periods in the rural sector. Moreover, railway freight rates 
were considered prohibitive by the coalmine owners who also owned 
colliers (ships especially constructed to transport coal). Therefore, sea 
transport remained dominant well into the twentieth century. Any 
improvement in transport was also offset by the effects of the potential of 
the industry to over produce.
As well as irregular income, Southern district miners were also 
subjected to a reduction in wages from the late 1870s until the end of the 
century. In the Illawarra district hewing rates were almost never 
determined on a sliding scale. However, owing to the contraction of the 
price of coal from 12/- per ton in 1876 to 4/9d. in 1898, the coalmine 
owners forced down the district hewing rate from 2/9d. in 1878 to 21- in 
1894. This rate continued to 1899 when it rose to 2/2d. after the 1890s 
depression [20], In addition, the workforce, despite severe periods of 
intermittent employment, increased prodigiously from 528 in 1876 to 
2352 in 1900. The swelling of the workforce beyond the demand for 
labour was the owners' stock-in-trade response of assuring that a large 
army of reserve labour was available for long hours whenever ships 
called. These pressures on the earning capacity of miners resulted in an 
intensification of the labour process as well as an increase in the amount 
of labour performed [21], Under these circumstances safety and health 
were of little consequence to the IMMPA and its successors. 
Furthermore, the union was often preoccupied with ensuring its viability. 
After being squeezed out of existence during the prolonged lock-out 
lasting from September 1886 to just prior to the Bulli disaster in March 
1887, the IMMPA was reformed in 1888 [22], In 1890, in an attempt to 
improve its increasingly weakening condition, IMMPA became a branch 
of the miners' organization, the A.M.A. [23] which operated in districts 
where minerals other than coal were mined.
The method under which coal was mined and wages were earned 
during the nineteenth century encouraged the non-observance of safety 
procedures. Arguably, piece-work, which was the customary method of 
payment in the United Kingdom where most N.S.W. coalminers came 
from, flourished because it suited employers owing to the irregularity of 
trade. Piece-work also encouraged unsafe working. Foremost, the
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'contract' [24] system ensured that hewers worked almost unsupervised 
[25]. They alone were responsible for the upkeep of their 'place' in the 
mine, a location known as the 'bord'. Under the 'bord and pillar' method, 
single or parallel 'headings' normally four yards wide, were driven off the 
main tunnels. Headings, like tunnels, were simultaneously haulage 
roadways and the means of ventilating the bords. Typically, bords four to 
six yards wide were driven off headings, ideally at right angles to each 
side of the heading. Sometimes bords were worked to adjoining parallel 
headings leaving, when possible, symmetrical blocks of coal or 'pillars' 
standing to support the 'roof. Until the 1950s it was more usual to let 
pillars stand but when they were worked miners systematically cut 
sections of pillars away until these were scarcely able to support the roof 
which would collapse when 'props' (supporting timber) were withdrawn.
Although there were many variations of bord and pillar, as well 
as the seldom used longwall system, all shared a basic similarity in the 
way the coal was separated from the 'solid' (or coalface). The face was 
initially undercut or holed generally at floor level, but if there was a band 
of stone or dirt in the face the face was cut near or in the band to separate 
it from the coal. The undercutting of the face was a skilful, arduous and 
dangerous task. Ideally, with a floorcut, the 'kerf (or the undercut) was 
made higher at the face, perhaps 18" to 24", and was tapered to the floor 
perhaps 6 feet or more under the face as the kerf progressed. The wedged 
shape of the kerf facilitated the easier removal of the 'solid' (the undercut 
coal) after the solid was drilled, charged with explosives and detonated. 
As miners paid for their gunpowder and fuses they were fortunate if the 
solid fell away unassisted. Hewers were often forced into contorted 
positions to undercut the coal by squatting or bending down. In a low 
seam where they could not swing their picks vertically they lay on their 
sides sometimes for hours at a time and often in water with the back of 
Uieir shovel the only support for tiieir head. There was always a danger 
when a hewer was right under die solid that it might give way dumping 
several tons of coal on him, particularly if he had not 'spragged' the coal 
by supporting it with short props positioned in the kerf. This safety 
measure was frequently not observed. Because hewers were paid by 
result safety procedures were often disregarded; any hold-up in the work 
process interfered with their earning capacity. This may appe;tr a gross
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disregard of the safety of others by individuals, but owing to the 
intermittent nature of the N.S.W. coal trade these and other malpractices 
were tolerated, and in fact, became an indispensable part of the economic 
survival o f both miners and coalmine owners.
Each pair o f miners undercut and sometimes sheared [26] the 
coal, drilled and shot the coal down and also filled the coal into skips. In 
addition, they laid the skip rails as the face advanced, set the timber and 
performed many other tasks. Aside from a cursory inspection by a deputy 
(a company's safety and production officer) perhaps once or twice a day 
when two shifts were worked, the hewers worked entirely unsupervised. 
This was one feature which attracted the owners to use piece-work, 
particularly in larger mines where there were more than a hundred bords, 
the furthest literally miles from the adit (the mine's main entrance/exit). 
However, this customary lack of supervision allowed miners a great deal 
of latitude in their work practices. Consequently, whenever possible they 
cut comers, despite the fact that unsafe practices placed themselves and 
their workmates at risk. Unsafe practices ranged from not spragging the 
solid while lying under it, to not setting enough props so that the roof 
might collapse without warning. Such practices also consisted of the 
careless use of explosives and safety lights which ultimately led to the 
explosion at Bulli.
This attitude to health and safety by miners and their union is not 
surprising. To a degree their attitude reflected nineteenth century 
indifference to work conditions. Miners were used to working in 
dangerous conditions and taking risks. Among N.S.W. coalminers the 
tradition of playing down health and safety hazards came with the 
introduction of the first free miners in N.S.W. who were not convicts. 
British miners brought with them a long history of placing economic 
well-being before personal health and safety. A succession of immigrant 
coalminers from England, Scotland and Wales also brought with them in 
their 'invisible luggage', the results o f being subjected to long hours 
underground, being surrounded by danger and atrocious working 
conditions. This invisible luggage turned out to be one of the main 
contributing factors in the Bulli disaster of 1887.
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CHAPTER THREE
3 The Inquest
According to law the cause of the explosion at the Bulli Mine 
had to be investigated by a coroner's inquest [1], However, the inquest 
seemed to be earmarked for special attention by the Government from its 
inception. Perhaps anticipating local antagonism in the Bulli district, a 
solicitor had been instructed by the Crown Solicitor to represent the 
interests of the Crown, the Government and the Department of Mines [2]. 
Adverse press reports criticising the Government and officers of the 
Department of Mines must have placed considerable pressure on the 
Government. The tone of the following newspaper article was typical of 
the criticism levelled at the Government:
(h)ow is it that a colliery explodes within a week of its being 
examined and pronounced safe by a Government officer?' [3]. 
The engaging of solicitors by the Department of Mines, the Bulli 
Coal Mining Company and the Illawarra Miners' Mutual Protective 
Association was a tacit admission that litigation by the three represented 
parties could be expected. The Daily Telegraph, commenting on the 
inimical atmosphere during the inquest, noted:
(s)ides were taken at its inauguration, and the distinction 
between defence and prosecution was as clear as noonday. The 
Bulli Coal Company were on their |>ic] trial and with them their 
manager and overman, the Examiner of Coalfields and the 
District Inspector. They must have all felt that; indeed, they 
often showed that they did, the asseverations of the counsel that 
it was not a trial notwithstanding. The Illawarra Miners' 
Association, but more particularly the more prominent remaining 
members of the Bulli Lodge of that association were the 
prosecutors [4].
The established procedure used by the Government was to send 
the Department of Mines inspector, Mr James Rowan, as its 
representative at coronial inquests in the Illawarra District. At the Bulli 
inquest however, in addition to a solicitor, the Government had taken the
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unprecedented step of requisitioning a Sydney magistrate, Mr George 
O'Malley Clarke from the Department of Justice, to assist the Coroner [5], 
The District Magistrate and Coroner, Mr J. F. Smith, was considered 
incapable of sitting on this case alone [6], Owing to the serious nature of 
this inquest, the Government's action appeared to be justified. 
Considering that Smith, a local businessman, had been appointed to the 
Bench not as the result of any legal expertise, but simply as the result of 
custom because he was a middle-class community leader, this was a 
sound decision. Furthermore, besides his coronial income, Smith had 
depended on the community for the better part of his livelihood in his 
capacity as land agent and auctioneer. The fraternal interactions between 
Smith and the miners during the inquest indicate that the Government's 
cause would have been better served without his presence. Statute law, 
however, prevented his total removal from the case [7]- Clarke's 
participation ensured Smith's co-operation to the extent that he was 
overawed by Clarke’s presence. The Daily Telegraph reported:
(t)hat gentleman, with a proper conception of his duties sat 
passively beside the Coroner, and throughout the whole 
investigation never infringed the dignity of the Court by any 
suggestion, advice to, or question through the Coroner; these 
were conveyed sotto voce . Hence there was the spectacle of an 
austere and dignified well known and able Sydney stipendiary 
magistrate sitting very close to an unobtrusive coroner, 
prompting more than two-thirds of the questions in a skilled and 
studied undertone [8],
Having served as Assisting Coroner, Clarke was also chosen as a 
Commissioner on the Royal Commission. The double appointment of 
Clarke must have been a unique judicial innovation. To serve twice as an 
adjudicator on the same matter appears contrary to any other N.S.W. legal 
precedent.
Newspaper articles suggested that the inquest jury was top-heavy 
with relatives who had lost their lives in the explosion. Furthermore, it 
was alleged that three jurors had worked in the Bulli mine until the strike 
and were not re-engaged when work resumed at the mine [9]. The verdict 
of the jury seems to reflect that the newspaper allegations were factual. 
One of the jurors, Joseph Walker, a farmer, had lost a brother and two
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nephews in the explosion. Walker and the three miners who were not re­
engaged by the company could hardly have been expected to return an 
unbiased verdict.
The principal object of Clarke's and the solicitor's appointment 
was a Government manoeuvre designed to minimise the prejudice of the 
inquest jury. However, this proved to be an impossible task. By law, 
jurors had to be chosen from eligible residents within the Bulli Jurors 
District [10]. Government interference could not alter that selection 
process. The Government solicitor was entitled to reject jurors who 
might be prejudiced and select those who might not be so prejudiced, or 
those who may have even been favourably inclined towards the 
Government. However, during the empanelling of the initial inquest jury 
on the day after the explosion, it became evident that most jurors had a 
relative or friend killed in the explosion. The jury rejection rate by the 
Crown solicitor climbed as more bodies were brought out o f the mine 
with the result that three entire juries were determined to be unsuitable 
and thus were disengaged. The district soon ran out of eligible jurors 
[11].
An acceptable jury was finally constituted. This panel consisted 
of five farmers, four publicans, a landlord, a butcher and a storekeeper- 
miner [12]. The Daily Telegraph alleged after the verdict had been 
received that:
(t)he number of disinterested jurors is doubtful. With all respect,
they must upon reflection see that they were biassed by their
previously and pre-maturely-formed convictions [13].
The Daily Telegraph's allegation seems well founded; the publicans, 
butcher, storekeeper and landlord would have been dependent largely on 
miners' patronage. Joseph Walker, the farmer who had lost three relatives 
no doubt would have been biased against the Department of Mines and 
the Bulli Coal Mining Company. While the disposition of the remaining 
four farmers could not be reliably determined, it seems likely that they 
may well have shared some of the bitterness of the local community. 
According to the Daily Telegraph, only one juror had friendly 
inclinations toward the government and the company for reasons of 
personal gain - he had a timber contract with the company [14].
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Notwithstanding governmental interference, the verdict 
implicated the Department of Mines and the Bulli Coal Mining Company. 
After being asked by the Coroner if the jury had reached their verdict the 
foreman replied:
(y)es, the Jury are of the opinion that William Wade and others 
came to their death in the Bulli Coalmine on the 23rd of March 
1887 by a gas explosion (and added as a rider) which was 
brought about by the disregard of the Bulli Colliery Special 
Rules and the Coal Mines Regulation Act, in allowing men to 
work when gas existed [ 151.
This was an unknown verdict for coal mining communities accustomed to 
the fatal nature of working underground. In inquests where the 
empanelling of juries was a legal requirement, invariably such juries 
relumed a verdict of accidental death. In the case of the Bulli jury owing 
to the immensity of the disaster and residual resentment over the 
company's role in the 1886-87 strike the trite verdict of accidental death 
was rejected. Instead, the jury openly blamed both the company and the 
Department of Mines for the disaster. Implicit in the verdict was that 
company management and Department of Mines officials had allowed 
miners to work in the presence of gas. The jury's reference to the 
disregard of the Bulli Colliery Special Rules could have implicated the 
miners, the Department of Mines, the company, or all three. The 
treatment of Government and company witnesses by the jury and the 
miners' solicitor left no doubt in the minds of people in the Department of 
Mines and the company as to whom the verdict was directed [16]. That 
the jury was earnest in its desire to incriminate the company and the 
Department of Mines is evident in the admissions of several jurors after 
the inquest. It was revealed that they had wanted to return a verdict of 
wilful neglect against the company and the Department. They had 
assumed however, that the appended rider in which they had conveyed 
that intention was as legally valid as the verdict itself [17].
The jury had been particularly critical of John Mackenzie, the 
Department of Mines' examiner of coalfields. The presence of Mr D. 
Rees, the Chairman, Mr W. Hunter, the Treasurer and Mr J. Curley, the 
General Secretary of the Coal Miners' Mutual Protective Association of 
the Hunter River District, seemed to encourage the already vindictive
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mood of the jury to harass Mackenzie and to a lesser extent James 
Rowan, the Department of Mines inspector for the Illawarra and Western 
districts [18]. Utilising the right of cross-examination by the foreman, the 
jury continuously assailed the opinions of both Government and company 
witnesses, especially testing the evidence given by Mackenzie and 
Rowan. Examiner Mackenzie, in particular, was frequently subjected to 
humiliating cross-examination by the jury and as a result he was criticised 
in the national press. In contrast, however, witnesses who gave evidence 
on behalf of the miners were treated with respect and cordiality by the 
jury [19]. Notwithstanding the jury's partisanship, their criticism of the 
Department of Mines was warranted.
The Government had been frequently criticised in Parliament 
and in the press over the negligence exhibited by officers of the 
Department of Mines. In 1886, in response to the Lithgow Valley 
Colliery Royal Commission, Mr. DeCourcy Browne, Member for 
Mudgee, cited the proprietors of the Lithgow Colliery, Mackenzie and 
Rowan as negligent and directly responsible for an accident at the 
Lithgow mine [20]. An article appearing in the Sydney Mail, anticipating 
that a Royal Commission into the Bulli disaster would be held, reported 
that:
(t)he matters of the recent coronial inquest and promised Royal 
Commission are the all-absorbing topics of public interest 
hereabouts. The late jury individually contend that their verdict 
was most intelligible and proper - press comments 
notwithstanding. It is maintained that the act clearly provides 
for the men to be removed from workings where gas exists, until 
sufficient protection be supplied; and this was not observed at 
the Bulli pit, according to the evidence [21].
The Government had been incriminated and reacted accordingly 
at two levels. With parliamentary powers at the Government's disposal, a 
Royal Commission was proposed and assented to by the Parliament. 
Many of the Members of Parliament had a vested interest in maintaining 
the strength and economic viability of the coalmining industry. At a 
departmental level, a smear campaign was launched against the Bulli 
miners by examiner Mackenzie [22] during the inquest. This campaign
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continued throughout the inquest and was maintained after the winding up 
of the Bulli Royal Commission.
The selection of jurors and other statutory prerequisites that 
applied to other types of inquests did not apply to the formation of Royal 
Commissions. The prejudice of the Bulli community could be overcome 
with the establishment of the Commission. The Cabinet, armed with the 
consent of a sympathetic Parliament, had the constitutional right to 
choose Commissioners and to select terms of reference, was able to 
reverse the verdict of the inquest by creating a puppet Royal Commission. 
Traditionally, Royal Commissions are constitutionally appointed by 
parliament which comprises the Crown, the Legislative Council and the 
Legislative Assembly. In practice members are chosen by the Minister 
responsible in conjunction with Cabinet [23],
From an official perspective, the Royal Commission was 
appointed to undertake a diligent and extensive inquiry into the cause of 
the explosion. It was further exhorted to ascertain the person or persons 
responsible and to make recommendations affecting the management and 
ventilation of the mine. Amendments to the 1876 CMRA which were 
concerned with the prevention of further gas explosions were due to be 
made [24]. A cursory review of the activities of the Commission seemed 
to suggest that it performed its appointed duties. In reality, manipulation 
by the Government subverted its objective mission. The Commission 
made recommendations regarding management and ventilation and 
suggested amendments to the 1876 CMRA. However, recommendations 
for improved mine management were ignored. Mr. Alexander Ross, the 
manager of the Bulli Mine continued as manager after the explosion and 
the old ventilation system in place at the time of the disaster remained. 
The suggestions made in order to improve the CMRA were ignored by 
Parliament for two years when the new CMRA was moved, only to be 
repressed until 1896 when it was enacted [25], By 1890 [26], the use of 
naked safety lights was universally adopted at the Bulli mine despite the 
fact that it had been an open safety lamp that had caused the explosion. 
Considering the immensity of the loss of life at Bulli and the potential for 
further disaster these were scarcely reactions calculated to make N.S.W. 
coalmines safer workplaces.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4 The Composition of the Royal Commission
The conduct of a Royal Commission depends upon the quality 
and character of the Commissioner (Australian Law Journal, 
(29): 268).
From the time it became apparent that the inquest was going to 
be followed by a Royal Commission, the composition of the Commission 
was debated in Parliament and in the press [1]. The Bulli correspondent 
for the Sydney M ail expressed the widespread fear of the community that 
a Royal Commission was to be established, the findings of which would 
be predetermined. The article stated that:
(t)he matters of the recent coronial inquest and promised Royal 
Commission are the all-absorbing topics of public interest 
hereabouts. The late jury individually contend that their verdict 
was most intelligible and proper - press comments 
notwithstanding. It is maintained that the Act clearly provides 
for the men to be removed from workings where gas exists, until 
sufficient protection be supplied and this was not observed at the 
Bulli Pit, according to the evidence. The mining community 
express little confidence in the action of a Royal Commission 
unless miners are represented thereon, as, it is urged, the 
sympathies of colonial experts are entirely with the proprietors; 
in fact, that such familiarity exists between the former and the 
latter that impartiality is next to impossible. Great stress is laid 
on the fact that officials, experts and managers, all fraternised 
during the recent inquest and the Bulli company's steamer 
conveyed those engaged on the inquest during its progress [2], 
Initially all appointees to the Commission were selected from the 
non-mining community [3]. The Government, in part due to adverse 
press and pressure from Parliament, relented to this pressure and included 
three miners as members of the Commission to make it appear more 
representative of all interest groups. However, an analysis of these three 
miners' educational qualifications suggests that none possessed a level of 
theoretical mining knowledge equal to the demands of underground
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safety requirements. Furthermore, two of them seemed to be more 
favourably inclined towards their employer than to their fellow workmen.
The Government's final choice of Commissioners were as 
follows: Chairman, Dr. James R. M. Robertson, mining engineer, and 
Director of several coal mining companies; Mr John Young Neilson, 
manager of the Wallsend Colliery; Mr Thomas Croudace, manager of the 
Lambton Colliery; Mr Joseph Hilton, checkweighman at the Mount Keira 
Colliery; M r John Jones, checkweighman at the Lambton Colliery; Mr 
John Owens, Secretary of the Coal Miners' Mutual Protective Association 
of the Western district at Lithgow and Mr George O'Malley Clarke, 
Stipendiary Magistrate. While it is true that most of the Commission's 
members had either practical or theoretical mining expertise, of its seven 
members six had little empathy with miners, being more favourably 
disposed towards management. G. O. Clarke possessed no knowledge of 
the industry whatsoever and perhaps he was suitably chastened by the 
adverse press reaction regarding his participation in the inquest and the 
Commission: Whatever the reason, Clarke's contribution to the 
Commission was negligible and he asked less than ten per cent of the 
total questions put to witnesses [4], most of which were asked in the 
absence of Robertson when Clarke had taken the Chair.
Dissatisfaction with the composition of the Commission was 
soon expressed by the Members for Northumberland, a three member 
electorate composed predominantly of miners. In contrast, the ever silent 
M.L.A. for Illawarra, M r Francis Woodward, did not oppose a Royal 
Commission, the membership of which reflected the interests of 
management. In fact, Mr Woodward did not speak on the Bulli disaster at 
all during the session of Parliament at the time of the disaster - neither did 
he ask any questions about the event [5]. It seemed that Woodward was 
not an active representative of his constituents; of all the 74 divisions of 
the House during the first session of the new Parliament, Woodward 
participated only in 25. His contribution to Committees can also be 
questioned as he attended only 24 out of a possible 76 sittings [6]. 
Notwithstanding his lack of vigour in parliamentary affairs, Woodward 
was re-elected in 1889 and served for a further two years.
It was Thomas Walker, one of the three members for 
Northumberland, who became one of the leaders of the miners' cause
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against the bias inherent in the Commission. Mr Walker had a twofold 
motivation for acting in this way. He wanted to satisfy the miners' lobby 
in his electorate [7] and to air his Protectionist dislike of Parkes' 'free- 
trade' Ministry. W alker emerged in Parliament as a trouble maker over 
the issue of the bias of four Commissioners and the submissiveness of the 
other three to the former. Despite his ulterior motives, Walker's criticism 
of the Government was justified, particularly as he endorsed one of his 
constituents' letters in Parliament which objected to the final selection of 
the membership of the Bulli Royal Commission:
It is [sic] reasonable to expect anything but a farce when such 
men as Dr. Robertson and J. Y. Neilson are appointed on the 
commission? The latter does not conduct the ventilation of his 
own colliery according to the present act ... . This appointment 
has caused intense dissatisfaction throughout this district [8[.
This anonymous criticism was justified. Neilson, the manager of the 
Wallsend mine, had contravened the CMRA on several occasions. Even 
the Department of Mines itself had been engaged in a dispute with 
Neilson regarding his repeated failure to observe the CMRA [9], It seems 
that Jones, Hilton and Owens were chosen as Commissioners to make the 
process appear to be representative of all interest groups, thereby 
counteracting criticism against the Commission such as those delivered 
by Walker. Another reason for the selection of Jones, Hilton and Owens 
was to exclude troublemakers such as the Newcastle Coal Miners' Mutual 
Protective Association's vociferous Secretary, Mr James Curley [10]. 
Curley, who had been instrumental in arousing high sentiment among 
miners over the Bulli disaster, was no doubt responsible for the majority 
of the Northumberland members' reaction to the disaster in Parliament 
[11]. Jones, Hilton and Owens served well the interests of managers and 
proprietors as predicted by Thomas Walker who saw that:
(t)he composition of this body clearly indicated that the interests 
of the miners would not be considered. The very fact that the 
commission was composed of Dr. Robertson, Mr. Neilson and 
Mr. Croudace on the one hand; and Messrs. Owen, Jones and 
Holden [«'c] on the other, with Mr. OMalley Clarke as 
chairman, showed that if any interests were to be considered at 
all they would be those of the managers and proprietors [12],
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The Illawarra Mercury also held an opinion which reflected a concern 
over the choice of Commissioners, in particular, the choice of Dr. 
Robertson. Robertson was later reputed to be able to get managers to do 
whatever he wanted [13]. Jones had served with Robertson and Neilson 
on the Femdale Colliery Royal Commission in 1886 and he knew how to 
maintain the role expected of working class people co-opted on official 
inquiries. If Jones forgot something, his manager at the Lambton Colliery 
as a fellow Commissioner could prompt him.
Croudace, like Neilson, had contravened the CMRA several 
times. One contravention had taken place as recently as 1886. The 
ventilation in the Lambton Colliery was so defective that powdersmoke 
from explosives was visible for the entire time of an unexpected visit by 
an inspector of the Department of Mines. Croudace's expertise must be 
considered as suspect. Under his management one of the pit tunnels at 
Lambton had been excavated so close to the surface that the main 
Northern Road, near Tighes Hill had subsided [14], It was examiner 
M ackenzie who had performed the survey for the tunnel. Yet Croudace, 
like Mackenzie and Neilson, was touted by the Department of Mines as 
well as the Government as one of the most knowledgeable experts on 
mining in the Colony [15].
Objections concerning the appointment of Croudace to the Royal 
Commission came from the Northern district and were numerous and 
frequently placed before Parliament by Walker and Mr Ninian Melville, 
another of the Northumberland members. A special objection was made 
to Croudace's treatment of his miners and his patronising attitude towards 
them. Croudace had been engaged in a minor pay dispute which 
developed into a seven month lock-out. His amicable relationship with 
Jones, who had been a checkweighman for 25 years [16], casts suspicion 
on Jones' self-interest. The precarious tenure of a checkweighman's 
occupation requires explanation as it reflects directly on Jones' social and 
economic aspirations. Under the CMRA, miners were entitled to appoint 
a  checkweighman [17] whose duty was to weigh at random a skip of coal 
as being average in content. The miners' piece-rates were calculated 
according to this process. However, mine managers employed company 
checkweighmen who were likely to choose a skip with less coal as the 
average weight. If the miners' representative chose a fuller skip as the
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average, the checkweighmen was liable to be dismissed and fined under 
an abuse of Section 20 of the CMRA which stated that:
(t)he checkweigher shall not be authorised in any way to impede 
or interrupt the working of the mine or to interfere with the 
weighing . . . .  If a checkweigher shall impede or interrupt the 
working of the mine or interfere with the weighing or otherwise 
mis-conduct himself such owner or agent may complain to the 
nearest Court of Petty Session ....  [18]
Jones had fulfilled the duties o f a checkweighman for 25 years without 
any problems [19] which suggests that he was a tool of management as 
there had been several prosecutions of other checkweighmen [20], 
Hilton, like Jones, was also a checkweighman who had similar 
aspirations. Hilton was politically active in the Illawarra electorate and 
had nominated Francis Woodward's opponent, Mr Andrew Lysacht, prior 
to Woodward's election [21]. The Bulli and Clifton Times and Illawarra 
M iners' Advocate, pandering to its predominantly miner based readership, 
deplored Hilton’s political attitude and ambition. An article in a February, 
1887 issue stated that:
... Mr. H. whose interesting twaddle about those monthly old 
'principles re protection and toryism had no effect upon the 
intelligence of the Illawarra miners, particularly those of Bulli 
and Coalcliff [22].
Hilton's proclivity towards achieving upward social mobility may well 
have affected his judgement during the investigation into the Bulli 
tragedy.
Neilson, like Croudace, had very poor working relations with his 
men. Since 1861, he had often battled the m iners'union [23], Unionism 
in the Northern district had been organised since 1860 [24], unlike the 
Southern coalfields where a permanent coalmining union was not 
organised until 1879 [25], In 1861, Northern districts owners decided it 
was in their best interests to create a united front and tackle this 
unwelcome combination of miners head-on. Neilson was a more than 
willing participant in this confrontation. Moreover, an owners' mutual 
protective organisation was formed which standardised piece-work rates, 
wages and hours which existed under various shapes and forms 
throughout the nineteenth century [26]. The owners' association was
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short-lived, but it was a forerunner of several organisations which 
combined to combat miners’ demands, generally for wage justice. The 
owners' aversion to spending money on equipment has previously been 
discussed. However, when it came to wage increases their antipathy was 
especially strong as it inevitably drew class antagonism into the equation. 
Neilson typified this disposition and his attitude toward workers was 
captured in a letter he wrote in 1888 to Mr. F. W. Binney, the Secretary of 
the then Masters' Association. In the letter he wrote about the strike­
breaking techniques he had employed and encouraged Binney to employ 
similar techniques. Clearly, Neilson was advocating an assault on 
workers; he referred to miners as the enemy and gave instructions on how 
to defeat them [27]. Neilson could not have been a man kindly disposed 
towards the Bulli miners - undoubtedly he favoured the interests of the 
Department of Mines and the Bulli Coal Mining Company. Another 
factor which must have affected Neilson's judgement was his employment 
by the company at the time of the explosion. He had been engaged by the 
company to measure the royalties owed to the Government from its 
Crown leases [28], Neilson also had a close association with Alexander 
Ross, the manager of the Bulli mine. Yet, he was required to pass 
judgement on him. Indeed, on the day of the explosion the two men had 
attended the Wollongong flower show together. Neilson, nevertheless, 
denied his connection with the company when confronted with the 
accusations of his bias in the matter [29].
Ninian Melville, M.L.A. for Northumberland, like Walker, was 
against Neilson's inclusion on the Commission. He felt that Neilson's 
judgement could be impaired as a result of his employment by the 
company. Melville's principal objection to Neilson's appointment was 
that Neilson had already testified as a witness at the inquest [30], and 
protested:
... that it was contrary to all ideas of British justice to first of all
take a man's evidence on a question and then appoint him a
judge to give determination upon it [31],
Melville, a Protectionist and liberal, to whom Sir Henry Parkes referred to 
as the 'veriest charlatan that ever lived' [32], was sympathetic to the 
miners' cause. Making the most of the Government's bad publicity over
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its handling of the Bulli affair, Melville continued to harass the Parkes 
Ministry over its choice of Commissioners. In support of Walker, 
Melville also questioned Croudace’s appointment [33] and disapproved of 
Dr. Robertson's appointment because he felt that his extensive financial 
interests in the coalmining industry would impair his judgement [34],
The controversy over Robertson's appointment caused the 
Government to mislead Parliament deliberately. Mr. Francis Abigail, the 
Secretary for Mines, and therefore the responsible Minister, responded to 
Melville's attack by stating th a t '... Dr. Robertson had no direct interest in 
any mine ... ' [35]. Yet, Department o f Mines correspondence to the 
Under-Secretary of Mines cites Robertson as 'directing manager' of 
Mount Kembla Colliery [36], The Under-Secretary was Abigail's 
immediate subordinate. In this case, either Abigail was unaware of 
Robertson's role, or he deliberately misrepresented his department's 
correspondence. It would appear the latter case was true. Abigail 
implicated himself after Melville insisted that Dr. Robertson's 
correspondence was always written on the note paper of a 'certain 
company'. To this, Abigail replied:
I submitted this very question to Dr. Robertson, and I have his 
' clear statement that he is not interested to the extent of a farthing 
in any mine in the colony [37].
Some doubt may be cast on Abigail's integrity, for in 1892 he was 
convicted of fraud as a result of his chairmanship of the Australian 
Banking Company and sentenced to five years hard labour [38].
Contrary to Abigail's denial, Robertson's level o f involvement 
was more than incidental. During the Mount Kembla Colliery Disaster 
Royal Commission in 1902, Robertson appeared as a witness, and 
revealed his close connection to the Mount Kembla Colliery which had 
lasted for 20 years [39], This association also attests to his close 
affiliation with Ebenezer Vickery, the owner of the Mount Kembla 
Colliery and a director of the Bulli Coal Mining Company at the time of 
the explosion [40], The legal firm established by the late Sir George 
Wigram Allen seems to be a common factor in several relationships on 
the southern district coalfields in the late 1880s [41],
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The Government's denial over Robertson's involvement in the 
coalmining industry was a futile exercise. It was common knowledge in 
the Illawarra district that Robertson was an active participant in the 
Illawarra Collieries Proprietors' Defense Association. This association, 
which included the Bulli Coal Mining Company as a member, had 
utilised Robertson as a spokesman during the campaigns the company had 
mounted against the striking workers in the 1886-1887 strike/lock-out
[42],
Reactions in Parliament to the appointment of miners on the 
Commission indicated the animosity some parliamentarians held towards 
workers in general. Mr. See, later Sir John and Premier of N.S.W. 
presumed:
(t)hat the object o f the minister in appointing the commission 
was to get at the truth as to the cause of the disaster in the Bulli 
mine. If the minister had appointed men who had a prejudice 
against the proprietors of the mine and a feeling in favour of the 
unfortunate miners the ends of justice would not be met [43].
Mr. John McElhone, M.L.A., concurred with Mr. See questioning the 
right of miners to nominate members of the committee [44], It is no 
surprise that both See and McElhone were actively involved in the 
coalmining industry.
The Government of the day could not claim that the Bulli Royal 
Commission fairly represented all interests. Thomas Walker's prophetic 
insights regarding the subservience of the miners' representatives on the 
Commission became fact. Jones, Hilton and Owens were overawed by 
the presence of the representatives of management, and consequently, 
their contributions to the Commission's judgement were insignificant 
compared to those made by Robertson. Out of 5963 questions asked, 
Jones put 434; Hilton 308; Owens, 354; Neilson, 317; Clarke, 538; 
Croudace, 1011; and Robertson, 2996 [45],
The motives driving Croudace are somewhat unclear. Possibly 
his actions can be explained by his desire to surpass Robertson's 
achievements because he had been engaged in a feud with Robertson
[46], Croudace was certainly regarded as an elder statesman in the 
mining community of the Northern district, an area where a locality was 
named in his honour. Although he was financially connected to several
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Northern district mines, in 1887 Robertson did not have as high a public 
profile in the Northern district as Croudace did. There also existed inter­
district rivalry between the Southern and Western districts which were 
both regarded as being substantially inferior to the north both in terms of 
output and quality of the coal. Neilson's lack of initiative might be 
explained in terms of a feud with Mackenzie, the examiner of coalfields
[47], Certainly Clarke's complete lack of knowledge of the mining 
industry explains his lacklustre performance.
The choice of Robertson had been a deft move. He skilfully 
manipulated most o f the Commissioners and witnesses. In the light of 
Neilson's and Croudace's contraventions of the CMRA and their 
disposition against workers, the Government could not hold the position 
that the Commission would be an impartial inquiry. Furthermore, 
considering Robertson's financial interests together with Clarke's 
ignorance of mining procedures and Jones', Hilton's and Owen's 
subservient roles, the Commission had little chance of doing justice to the 
issues at hand. In a similar vein, the financial interests of 
parliamentarians does not provide any indication that the Commission 
was initiated out of an altruistic desire to improve safety in the mining 
industry through legislation. If there had been a genuine desire to 
eradicate reckless behaviour by miners and neglect by management and 
Department of Mines officers, successive parliaments would not have 
needed nine years to legislate the new Coal Mines Regulation Act.
Bulli mining disaster 1887
CHAPTER FIVE 
5 The Bulli Royal Commission
... of the seven gentlemen constituting the Commission, 
probably only two had a hand in its compilation ... (Illawarra 
Mercury, 19 July, 1887).
To avoid the emotive atmosphere witnessed at the Bulli inquest, 
Robertson decided to hold the Bulli Royal Commission at the 
Wollongong Town Hall. Because Wollongong was not yet connected by 
rail to Bulli and the journey by road was tortuous the difficulty of the 13 
kilometre journey from Bulli to Wollongong precluded those miners who 
were not witnesses attending the hearing. Although the Commission was 
open, the strictly controlled mode of conduct was the opposite of the 
informal atmosphere which had prevailed during the inquest. Robertson, 
empowered by the Taking o f  Evidence by Commissioners Act, tightly 
controlled the entire procedure [1], He determined the type of'questions, 
instructed his subordinate Commissioners on how to conduct an 
examination of witnesses and chose the witnesses. The Illawarra 
Mercury commented that:
(t)he Bulli Commission began taking evidence at Wollongong 
yesterday. The inquiry was conducted with open doors, but the 
attendance was small owing, it is believed, to the strong feeling 
at Bulli that the inquiry ought to have been held there. The 
president, Dr. Robertson made a lengthy opening address to his 
fellow commissioners in which he gave them advice as to the 
manner in which they should act and conduct themselves. He 
also addressed the press [2],
Given the choice of Commissioners, the selection of questions 
and witnesses, the outcome of the Royal Commission was not entirely 
unexpected. The judgement exonerated Mr. Alexander Ross, the manager 
of the Bulli Colliery, Mr James Rowan, the Department of Mines 
inspector and Mr J. Mackenzie, the examiner of coalfields. While the 
Royal Commission reproached Mr. Richard White, the overman, and 
some of the deputies, it first and foremost blamed miners for the
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explosion [3], The stance adopted by the Commissioners ignored the fact 
that as with the vicarious responsibility associated with the position of 
captain of a vessel at sea, under the CMRA, the ultimate responsibility for 
all aspects of mining rested with mine management and the Department 
of Mines [4], The Special Rules accorded to each mine under the CMRA 
gave the manager total control over all officers and made the manager 
responsible for the safety of miners [5], Ross often had flouted the 
'Special Rules for the Bulli Colliery', especially those sections relating to 
ventilation, safety lamps and gas. Furthermore, the CMRA provided for 
the examiner and the inspector to ensure that all regulations were adhered 
to by the mine managers. Rowan and Mackenzie had not checked to 
confirm if Ross had observed all provisions of the CMRA. Their 
absolution, therefore, depended on Ross's exoneration by the 
Commission. The Commissioner's rationale seemed to have been to 
establish Ross's innocence, thereby undermining the charges against him 
that were implied as a result of the verdict delivered at the inquest. 
Having exonerated Ross, the charge that Mackenzie and Rowan were 
derelict in their duties would become redundant.
The Royal Commission's desire to exonerate Ross and officials 
o f the Department of Mines was a goal which was supported by other 
managers in the Illawarra district. More than likely, they wanted to 
establish Ross' competency as a means of reflecting the competency of 
officials generally, thus protecting their own interests so that the Bulli 
explosion was seen as an isolated unfortunate accident [6], It appeared 
that they did not wish to implicate the Department of Mines, an action 
which might attract heavy measures of retribution by inspections 
sometime in the future [7], In contrast to the observations made by 
managers and the Commissioners, the testimony records that the real 
cause of the explosion was linked to negligence by both colliery 
management and the Department of Mines. Flagrant disregard of the 
CMRA by Ross, Mackenzie and Rowan had created the conditions which 
eventually led to the Bulli explosion.
The reasoned judgement of the Royal Commission was that the 
disaster occurred because a miner had used explosives carelessly. As far 
as the Commission was concerned, the person or persons to blame for the 
accident was either:
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Westwood, or his mate (both deceased) who at the moment were 
working at the face of no. 2 heading and who prepared and fired 
the shot, which in the opinion of the Commission was the 
immediate or primary cause o f the explosion [8].
The indictment of Westwood and his mate ignored the actual causes of 
the explosion which included faulty ventilation, frequent contraventions 
of the CMRA , and an almost complete absence of safety procedures in the 
mine. One contributory factor was an oversight by Ross who neglected to 
ensure that his instructions regarding the firing of shots were observed. 
The firing of shots created the most likely condition under which an 
explosion could take place [9], especially at Bulli where miners used 
highly volatile coaldust as tamping material and opened their safety 
lamps in a gas laden atmosphere to light the fuses. Ross had given the 
overman Richard White instructions to allow only deputies to fire shots 
due the dangerous nature of the procedure. Yet, implausible as it seems, 
Ross had not provided a deputy on the nightshift. This dereliction of duty 
did not, however, convince the Royal Commission of any incompetence 
on Ross' part in the disaster. There was no provision under the 1876 
CMRA for shotfiring procedure and managers were left to use their own 
discretion. Ross' inattention to shot-firing was irresponsible, not illegal. 
On this matter the Royal Commission commented blandly that '(t)he 
arrangement for firing shots ... was unusual and unsatisfactory' [10].
Ross also had given instructions not to fire shots in the presence 
of gas, yet he had provided no means to remove such gas. He had not 
furnished equipment to conduct the air current to the working face as 
required by the CMRA. Nevertheless, he was only guilty of a small 
oversight, and according to the Royal Commission:
... the deputy Robert Millward [.v/c] deceased, Richard White, 
overman, and to a less extent (except in the matter of providing 
bratticing for which he was alone responsible) Alexander Ross, 
manager, were guilty of contributory negligence [11].
This was one of the few instances in which Ross was reprimanded in the 
Commission's lengthy summation.
There were several ventilation problems at the Bulli mine. One 
of the more serious was the use of a system which brought gas from one
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heading to other headings. Another problem was the failure to brattice up 
to the face. The accumulation of gas as a result of the ventilation system 
introduced by Ross, and approved by Rowan and Mackenzie, did in all 
probability cause the explosion. The Royal Commission, however, 
merely believed that 'it betrayed an absence of forethought' by Ross [12]. 
The air current at Bulli was drawn in at the adit and after being prevented 
from entering several unused workings and tunnels by stoppings, or walls 
made from worthless pit-stone, the air was divided into two main 
portions. One portion supplied the Western district, the other the main 
tunnel to the Hill End district where the explosion took place.
The dividing of the air at the junction of these tunnels was 
brought about by a door with a regulating shutter which directed the 
amount of air that passed to each district. The air in the main tunnel was 
then conducted through the No. 1 heading into the No. 2 heading via a 
'cut-through'. According to the CMRA, as headings advanced they had to 
be connected every 35 yards by cut-throughs or 'stentons' in order to 
allow the air to circulate near the advancing face which was the most 
likely location for gas [13]. To prevent air from escaping through old 
stentons, these routes were sealed with stoppings as the headings 
progressed.
After passing through No. 2 heading from No. 1, the air was then 
circulated to headings 3, 4, 5 and 6, which were also driven off the main 
tunnel. In order to prevent the air from going straight up the main tunnel, 
a door was placed between Nos. 1 and 2 and each subsequent pair of 
headings. Every heading had working places or 'bords' driven off them to 
each side. As each bord was 'worked out' of coal it was also sealed off by 
stoppings to prevent the air current circulating through. This cost-cutting 
device, although not illegal, was another doubtful mining practice as 
unused bords were precisely the locations where firedamp might 
accumulate. As the ’working’ bords advanced, they too were supposed to 
be connected with cut-throughs if their length exceeded 35 yards [14],
The short-comings of the ventilation system used at Bulli were 
numerous. When gas was encountered in the No. 1 heading and some of 
its working bords, it was conducted into the No. 2 and successive heading 
to be emitted by the 'furnace', an underground fire which expelled the air 
by convection through a vertical shaft. The direction of the air current
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swept explosive firedamp into sections where men were working with 
naked lights. The regulating door at the junction of the main tunnel and 
the Western tunnel as well as the doors between the headings were 
frequently opened, allowing for even a greater accumulation of gas.
The installation of a new furnace during the strike, which had 
trebled the volume of air, had lulled Ross and the overman, White, into a 
false sense of security [15]. It appears that Ross and White had neither 
the expertise nor cared to ensure whether or not the air supply reached the 
critical destinations, the working faces in the headings and bords. 
Although Ross's ventilation system was criticised by some of those 
witnesses kindly disposed towards him [16], the members of the Royal 
Commission did not feel disposed to attach any blame to Ross, and 
conceded that Ross had depended too much on the improved air current 
and admonished him for not using bratticing [17]. Neither Rowan nor 
Mackenzie ever complained to Ross about the impracticability of the 
ventilation system. Until the explosion the system was considered to be 
safe. Evidence tendered by Rowan and Mackenzie at the Royal 
Commission indicates that they were aware of alternative modes of 
ventilation but had not considered it necessary to bring them to the 
attention of Ross [18].
During the sitting of the Royal Commission, a frequent criticism 
of the Bulli ventilation system was that double doors were not generally 
in use. Yet, no mention of double doors was made at the inquest by the 
same witnesses, until a Bulli miner, Mr John Hobbs, reminded them that 
it was common to use double doors in Britain [19]. The single door 
system used at Bulli frequently caused the derangement of the air current 
and aggravated the build-up of gas. Because the doors had been placed 
thoughtlessly in the air tunnels which were also the main traffic 
thoroughfares, the doors had to be frequently opened to let up to twenty 
skips past. The ventilation of No. 1 and No. 2 headings was entirely 
dependent on two single doors. In fact, the entire district and the life of 
every workman in the district was also dependent on those two single 
doors [20].
Ross did not feel that double doors were a necessity; neither did 
the Commissioners, who believed that:
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(i)n the case of Bulli, the lengths of trains would have 
necessitated their being placed 160 feet apart. This under the 
circumstances would have been impossible and the practice is 
not pursued in any Australian colliery [21].
The circumstances which prevented the use of double doors were 
financial considerations only. This was typical of the parsimony which 
prevailed in the industry during the nineteenth century; partially owing to 
(lie intermittency of trade, but also as a result of a traditional antipathy to 
investment on equipment that was not considered necessary. There were 
no practical obstacles for excluding the doors as Ross and the 
Commissioners suggested. During the course of the Royal Commission, 
there were numerous references made by Robertson, individual miners 
and managers in relation to the high safety standards in Britain, yet these 
standards were not implemented in N.S.W. It would appear that the 
unquestioning acceptance of inadequate safety measures in N.S.W. in 
general and by all concerned with the Bulli mine had led to the explosion.
The driving of headings and bords more than 35 yards ahead of 
the air was another gross transgression of the CMRA [22], Generally, this 
widespread malpractice was also motivated by cutting costs and served to 
compound the problems associated with the ventilation system at Bulli. 
As headings and bords were advanced they often came upon the problem 
of the dykes and rolls, which meant that production was hampered by the 
mining of worthless stone. A financial hurdle arose when the next 
stenton to the adjoining heading or bord had to be cut through this waste 
material.
To avoid this costly exercise, managers often ignored the CMRA 
35 yard regulation. They cut stentons only where coal was known to 
exist. On occasions at Bulli, cut-throughs in bords and headings were 
more than 42 yards ahead of the air. This illegal practice was condoned 
by both Rowan and Mackenzie [23], On that breach of the CMRA alone, 
Ross should have been charged by Rowan who was supposed to check the 
distances between cut-throughs. Instead of inspecting the entire colliery 
once every eight weeks as stipulated by the CMRA [24], Rowan had 
aggravated the ventilation and gas problem by not inspecting the mine 
regularly [25], The Commissioners recorded:
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(e)xcepting Nos. 1 and 2 headings the Commission are inclined 
to accept the testimony of the only trustworthy authority that 
submitted themselves for examination - Mr. Inspector Rowan 
who, although his visits were frequent, yet found no amount of 
gas in this section, and the minute examination of the colliery by 
the Commission confirms this [26].
The exception to evidence given by Rowan pertaining to heading Nos. 1 
and 2 was probably a measure to safeguard Rowan's integrity because he 
had claimed while giving evidence that he had never detected any gas
[27]. Contradictory to Rowan's evidence, the source of the explosion had 
been heading No. 1 or No. 2, which confirmed the report by miners of gas 
in the area - this report incriminated Rowan.
Rowan's trustworthiness and reliability was central to the Royal 
Commission's refutation of evidence given by the miners, particularly in 
regard to the reporting of gas. During an inspection a few days after the 
explosion, some of the Commissioners unofficially observed some gas in 
headings No. 1 and 2 but they attributed that to the damage done to the 
ventilation [28]. On 18 May during a subsequent official inspection, no 
gas was detected in those headings. A slight amount of gas, however, 
was detected in No. 3 heading. The Royal Commission put this down to 
an improvement of the partially repaired ventilation which showed a 
reading of 2160 cubic feet of air per minute [29], The first inspection 
should have indicated to the Commissioners that gas did issue in headings 
No. 1 and 2, a fact which Rowan had denied. He claimed that he had 
noticed a little gas in other headings only. The absence of gas during the 
Royal Commission's inspection of 18 May confirmed the probability that 
firedamp had appeared and reappeared due to its erratic nature, a fact 
consistent with common nineteenth century mining knowledge [30].
The Commissioners' explanation that the absence of gas on that 
occasion was due to the improved ventilation seems implausible; the 
2160 cubic feet per minute was sufficient to disperse gas only when no 
men were working. The Commissioners had at their disposal Rowan’s 
report o f 9 August 1886, in which he recorded that the Hill End district 
was supplied with 3600 cubic feet per minute for 36 men and horses [31]. 
The minimum amount of air allowable under the CMRA was 100 cubic 
feet per man and horse per minute [32], Clearly, the ventilation could not
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have dispersed gas adequately during that inspection given the small 
quantity of air.
The presence of gas, as an additional problem to the ventilation 
deficiency, raised great dissent during the sittings of the Royal 
Commission. The pivotal argument was over the amount of gas reported. 
Generally, miners claimed that they had encountered large amounts of gas 
while management and government witnesses testified to small quantities 
being present. The Royal Commission believed the company and 
government witnesses and discredited the evidence of those men who had 
worked in the No. 1 and No. 2 headings and had who witnessed large 
quantities of gas. The Commissioners and qualified experts need not 
have played down evidence which supported large quantities of gas. 
They were aware of, and had acknowledged that only small quantities of 
gas were required to cause an explosion. In fact, with coaldust 1.9 to 9.8 
per cent of gas volume in the air is the critical range. Amounts of more 
than 15 per cent renders the mixture almost harmless. This was 
consistent with the then scientific knowledge on the role of gas and 
coaldust in coal mine explosions [33], Those Commissioners with coal 
mining expertise recognised coaldust as the real agent in an explosion 
[34], Thus, the argument over the amount of gas was redundant.
However, the denial o f the veracity of the reports by miners of 
large amounts of gas was necessary for Ross's, Rowan's and Mackenzie's 
exoneration. When gas was encountered, several safety procedures 
specified by the CMRA had to be observed. They were, however, 
ignored. These safety procedures consisted of recording in a book the 
detection of gas, the removal of the men if the amounts were considered 
to be dangerous, the issue of safety lamps to the miners and the erection 
of warning signals to alert miners of the dangers. At Bulli no report book 
was kept and the men were not removed. The warning signals or danger- 
boards were erected, but ignored by miners.
The overturning of the miners' evidence increased as the 
controversy over the quantities of gas escalated. While having been 
mildly censured for not making regular inspections of the pit, Ross, like 
Rowan, was elevated in status as an expert witness. In particular, his 
evidence regarding the quantity of gas was considered to be reliable. The 
Royal Commission recorded that:
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(t)he evidence of the Manager, Mr. Ross, who did not often 
inspect the workings, and of his overman, Richard White, points 
to the presence of small quantities of gas only [35],
The reference to Ross's infrequent inspections is phrased in an 
euphemistic fashion. Ross seemed to possess only a poor knowledge of 
the underground workings. After the explosion, while leading a search 
party, he was forced to concede that he had lost his way [36], Obviously, 
Ross lost his way because of the infrequent number of inspections he had 
made of the mine. Accordingly, his knowledge of gas problems in 
different parts of the mine must be suspect.
Several experienced miners who had worked in headings No. 1 
and 2 had reported large quantities of gas before and after the strike, and 
gave evidence accordingly [37]. One drillhole in the face of the No. 1 
heading emitted so much gas that it could be heard to 'hum' some 40 
yards away [38], While this volume of gas was not dangerous it 
suggested the presence of firedamp which the Royal Commission was so 
intent on denying. The Commission refuted the miners claims, recording 
that:
(t)his starting [j/c] statement emanated from men who had no 
extensive knowledge of mining or any previous experience of 
firedamp [39];
and:
(i)n other respects the statements of these witnesses were not 
borne out by those of calmer more intelligent and truthful men 
[40],
Those calmer, more intelligent and truthful men were the miners whose 
evidence had supported the evidence of management and Department of 
Mines officers.
When the deputy James Crawford was shown the hummer - an 
audible issue of gas, he inserted a gas pipe with a tap into the drillhole to 
convince Ross and White of the large quantities of firedamp [41]. The 
purpose of the tap was to allow the gas to escape only when it was turned 
on. In the presence of Ross and White, the gas was lit by Crawford,
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irresponsibly with a naked light. The force of the gas was so strong that it 
extinguished the flame if the tap was turned on more than half way [42], 
The above act of bravado demonstrates the small regard miners 
had even toward their own safety. Under examination by Robertson, 
Ross played down the size of the blower. He claimed that Crawford had 
inserted the pipe in the hole to show his ingenuity [43], The Commission 
readily accepted Ross's explanation, recording that there was:
... evidence of a small blower in No. 1 heading from whence gas 
issued for some weeks into which a pipe was fixed. It, however 
appears to have issued with no great force [44],
Ross, nevertheless, with justification protested to the Commission about 
Crawford's use of a naked light under such dangerous circumstances [45], 
Ironically, Ross' protestation about Crawford's use of a naked light in a 
gas laden atmosphere corroborated the miners' evidence concerning gas. 
The company had implicitly acknowledged the existence of firedamp by 
distributing safety lamps. Safety lamps had to be issued once firedamp 
was encountered in accordance with the Special Rules.
The purpose of the Davy safety lamp was twofold. It was used 
by deputies to detect gas, as firedamp is undetectable by human senses, 
being tasteless, odourless and colourless. Even today, similar principles 
apply to the detection of gas. The size and colour of the flame determines 
the volume and constitution of the gas. If the volume of gas is greater 
than the volume of air, the flame will extinguish automatically. The 
second use of the safety lamp is as its name implies. The flame is 
enclosed by two separate gauzes and a glass case. Air can enter the lamp, 
but the flame cannot escape and ignite the gas outside the lamp.
The method of distribution and the abuse of safety lamps at Bulli 
was in direct contravention of the CMRA [46]. The dependence by 
miners on the safety lamp demanded that a strict maintenance policy be 
observed. Evidence had been given by miners that they had been issued 
with safety lamps with a faulty gauze and in one instance, without even a 
gauze [47]. A lamp without a gauze would be as unsafe as a naked light. 
The gauzes deteriorated very rapidly as it was a common mining practice 
to light fuses from an open lamp. This deterioration was brought on by 
tilting the lamp which caused oil to spill onto the gauze, which would
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turn red hot, making the lighting of fuses easier. An alternative method 
was to hold a wire or a kerosene soaked 'touch paper’ on the gauze and 
then to light the fuse.
Although these techniques were criticised by the 
Commissioners, no alternative methods of lighting explosives were 
proposed by members of the Commission, nor were other methods 
provided for by the company. The same witnesses who had reported the 
hummer also claimed they had been issued with faulty lamps. It was no 
surprise to find out that they were dismissed as being unreliable witnesses
[48]. Ross's failure to ensure that safety lamps were locked, cleaned and 
fitted with gauzes was not deemed punishable by the Commission.
Once the existence of gas was established, safety lamps had to 
be circulated to miners in the affected section. The CMRA specified:
(w)henever any safety lamp is required to be used it shall be first 
examined and securely locked by some person duly authorized 
for that purpose who shall keep the key thereof [49].
Those regulations were not adhered to by either the overman, or the 
deputies after the strike. Ross did not ensure that his instructions 
concerning the locking of safety lamps were observed. From the 
Commissioners’ point of view:
Mr. Ross issued instructions to his overman and deputies to lock 
all lamps; but that for some cause, and unknown to Mr. Ross, 
this order had not been strictly carried out for some weeks 
preceding the explosion. At the same time the Commission are 
fully aware how very difficulty it is to get subordinates to carry 
out orders in their integrity [50].
The issue of safety lamps was an unpopular one with miners 
because they gave off a very dim, flickering, orange coloured light. In 
general, miners preferred to work with the brighter naked light and were 
determined to make use of this method of lighting even if safety 
regulations were flouted in the process. While the safety lamps were 
easily extinguished by even a slight disturbance, they were very hard to 
light again if they were locked. The illumination of miners' immediate 
working quarters was entirely dependent on two dim safety lights. Miners 
at Bulli and elsewhere worked on piece-rates in teams of two and for the
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reasons explained in Chapter Two were anxious about lost time if  their 
light was accidendy extinguished. Before the strike, an extinguished light 
often resulted in a long walk by one of the team to the deputy's cabin in 
order to have the lamp lit as all lights were kept under lock and key by 
Crawford. This time consuming process was considered an annoyance by 
the men and whenever possible, the miners tried to avoid working with 
locked lights despite the obvious dangers associated with this procedure. 
After the strike, Crawford was not re-engaged and most of the time the 
new deputy, Millwood, did not bother to lock the lamps. Miners readily 
took advantage of Millwood’s casual style of management by working 
with unlocked lights in gas laden sections of the mine despite the 
presence of firedamp [51].
The safety lamps at Bulli were only locked with a simple device 
which was easily unlatched with any sharp implement [52]. During one 
nightshirt when no deputy had been provided, the men opened their lamp 
by using the key which had been left behind for that purpose by Millwood 
on the previous shift [53]. When questioned about this occurrence during 
the Commission, the miners recounted how they were confused as to what 
action to take if their light should go out without a deputy on duty. Mr 
Albert Smithers said in evidence that:
(o)n Monday night, when we first started after the strike, we 
went to the cabin for our lamps and Millwood handed us our 
lamps locked. Richards said to him, "What are we to do if we 
get in the dark?" and Millwood said, "I will leave the key", so he 
unlocked the lamps and never locked the lamps afterwards [54]. 
This appeared to corroborate that Millwood had been negligent 
in his duties. However, such evidence was discredited by the 
Commissioners because of the implicit faith Ross placed in Millwood's 
capacity as a deputy. Smithers' evidence was dealt with accordingly [55], 
Smithers had given the same evidence at the inquest and the transcript 
was read to him verbatim at the Commission. During the inquest he had 
stated that Millwood had never locked his lamp, although he testified at 
the Commission that he had admitted that Millwood had briefly locked 
his lamp and then immediately unlocked it. The Commissioners branded 
him as a perjurer because of his use of the word 'never' in a vernacular 
sense [56],
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The management at Bulli rarely enforced strict discipline and the 
men responded accordingly. Miners were used to smoking in the 'gassy 
district' and were permitted to carry tobacco and matches underground. 
While the Special Rules provided that a danger-board be erected across 
the entrance of any section where firedamp was found [57], this 
procedure was not always strictly followed. In the No. 1 heading where 
sizeable amounts of gas issued, a danger-board was hung at the last 
stenton. Nevertheless, the miners continued to smoke carelessly just 
outside the danger-board.
The night before the explosion Thomas Morgan, a wheeler, had 
hung his naked light on the danger-board after he was requested to do so 
by Mr William Hope, an experienced miner. Notwithstanding that his 
light was 28 yards from the face, the action ignited firedamp with a sheet 
of flame more than 4 yards long [58]. As no official was present during 
the incident, neither Hope, Morgan, nor any of the men working that shift 
bothered to report the incident to White the overman, or to any other 
official. The men had become so accustomed to the elements of danger 
and so familiar with working under life threatening conditions that after 
their shift they did not consider it necessary to call at White's house which 
was near the pit to report the sudden eruption of gas. Another motivation 
on the part of the men for not reporting the incident to White was fear. It 
was generally believed by Bulli miners that they would lose their job if 
they reported any danger.
The reason miners gave for not reporting particular hazards was 
die belief that the 'Engagement Rules of the Bulli Colliery’ precluded 
them from reporting anything to the manager or Department of Mines 
inspector. The section which miners misinterpreted was rule No. 6 which 
decreed that:
(a)ny employee interfering in any way with the orders issued by 
the colliery manager or his overman for regulating the work of 
the mine shall be liable to dismissal without notice [59].
Rule No. 6 was preceded by Rule No. 5 which stated that:
(t)he colliery manager shall have full command over all 
employees in or about this colliery. They shall apply to, and
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take their orders and instructions from him or such other person 
as may be appointed to act on his behalf [60],
Notwithstanding the miners' misinterpretations of Rules No. 5 and 6, one 
candid reason why they could not report the dangerous situation was the 
fact that according to Rule No. 3 of the Engagement Rules, miners could 
not leave their allotted working place. Rule No. 3 stated that:
(a)ny miner or other employee found in any part of the mine or 
colliery other than that in which he should be working without 
the consent of the colliery manager, shall be liable to dismissal 
without notice [61].
Each man at Bulli had signed the Engagement Rules as part of 
the agreement reached with the company to settle the strike. In essence, 
refusal meant unemployment. Intimidated and menaced after the 
prolonged strike, the majority of miners signed the 'Engagement Rules' 
without fully realising the restrictive nature of the Rules which were 
drafted in accordance with the CMRA Special Rules section which gave 
them a legal status. Although the Special Rules and Engagement Rules 
could be used to invoke prosecution under the archaic Masters and 
Servants Act for small offences such as absence from work, the 
Commissioners refused to understand the logic behind the miners' 
misconstruction of the rules. The Commissioners were unable:
... to comprehend how intelligent men could permit themselves 
to be persuaded to display such pusillanimity and to pervert or 
torture the words "That any interference with the orders of the 
Manager" into meaning that they must not report danger, 
especially as they admitted that no orders had been issued by the 
Manager to the effect that men were not to report danger and that 
they did not ask the manager whether Rule 6 would bear the 
interpretation given it be Nicholson and others [62],
Indeed, m ost miners admitted under cross-examination that no 
direct order had been given by Ross not to report danger. The 
Commission's interpretation was absurd; no manager would give direct 
orders to that effect. The failure to report danger was due to a 
misinterpretation of the rules by the miners because of the hierarchical 
relationship implicit in relationships between miners and managers. 
Miners felt restricted by social barriers and reinforced by a false sense of
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security and bravado to dangerous situations they simply failed to take 
action and report the hazard.
The Commission, nevertheless, continued its harassment over 
the men's interpretation of the Engagement Rules by attacking the 
IMMPA and its nominal head, M r John Barnes Nicholson, who as 
secretary of the Illawarra Miners' Mutual Protective Association had been 
the first person to misinterpret Rule No. 6. Once union members had 
accepted Nicholson's interpretation he had not bothered to relay to 
management the miners' misgivings about the rules. He also failed to 
make a formal criticism of the rules. Moreover, Nicholson could have 
made a severe and telling criticism of the company as he had not been re­
employed by the company after the strike, and therefore was not bound 
by Rule No. 6. Wishing to avoid industrial and personal confrontation, 
Nicholson claimed he had known about the perilous condition of the 
mine, but had not reported it to management.
Less than two weeks before the explosion, Nicholson had 
ominously predicted the destruction of the mine, yet he allowed the men 
to continue working. Mr. Jerry Westwood, the miner to whom the cause 
of the explosion was attributed, told Nicholson less than a fortnight 
before the explosion about a hummer which could be heard 100 yards 
away. Nicholson's prophetic reply was ' God help you; one of these days 
you will get it' [63], That response had been Nicholson's only known 
reaction, he did not feel he had the right to interfere as he claimed 
correctly that everyone including management, knew about the excessive 
quantities of gas [64]. Nicholson sought to shield his own ambivalence in 
the matter behind the union's past dealings with management. When 
Robertson asked Nicholson:
(h)olding the responsible position you do and being the leader of 
others, did you no think it was your own duty to take steps to 
avert such an evil as that?, 
he replied as a matter of fact:
I did not think I had any right whatever [65].
The reasons why Nicholson did not report the danger to the 
company at first appear obscure. Even Edgar Ross, who was intent on the 
glorification of miners as the archetypal worker in A History o f  the
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Miners' Federation o f  Australia is forced to frown upon Nicholson's 
behaviour [66], Ross maintains that Nicholson, although being a 
conscientious union secretary, consistently opposed industrial action, and 
in this light he could be seen as a class collaborator [67], Perhaps 
Nicholson's ambivalence could be explained by his political ambitions 
which were realised in 1891 when he was elected as the Labor member 
for Illawarra. By 1887 he may well have been sensitive to the distaste 
coalmine owners had to measures that would require the implementation 
of costly safety devices. In a sitting of Parliament in 1892 during one of 
many debates on the ill-fated Coal Mining Regulation Bill. Nicholson 
held that bratticing would not only save miners' lives, but that:
(i)t would also be a financial saving to mine owners ... and I feel 
certain that the money paid by the mine-owners in the shape of 
damages and for law costs would have provided brattice for the 
whole of that mine for the next ten years to come. Everyone 
knows what the price of lumber is and if  they want to use 
anything cheaper they can use canvas; which will answer the 
purpose as well [68].
Nicholson once elected as an official Labor candidate refused to sign 'the 
pledge' along with several other Labor miner parliamentarians for reasons 
I have explained elsewhere [69]. Subsequently, Nicholson stood as an 
independent Labor candidate in the 1898 election [70], Although he 
rejoined the Labor Party, he was eventually expelled in 1916 [71]. His 
obituary reflects his political pragmatism ;uid reads in part:
Mr. Nicholson was one who had a difficulty which he sometimes 
failed to overcome in subordinating himself to party ... . Mr. 
Nicholson more than once uttered to mass meetings words of 
comments and advice that displeased and thereby he 
undoubtedly lost supporters [72],
Nicholson was reprimanded by the Commission over his apathy in 
reporting danger prior to the explosion. As far as the Commission was 
concerned:
Mr. Nicholson's conduct..., if he really did know of danger and 
took no steps to communicate with the inspector, the Minister 
for Mines, or his late fellow workmen, betrays an obliquity of 
character that they [the commissioners] sincerely trust is
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uncommon in the Colony, and will meet with censure that it so 
deservedly merits [73].
Ironically, while the Commissioners were casting aspersions on
Nicholson's character, they again contradicted their own observations
regarding the quantities of gas present at Bulli. They had maintained
during the course of the Commission and in their summation, that the
quantities of gas were small. Yet, while Nicholson was being cross-
examined, the Commissioners had inadvertently admitted to the existence
of large quantities of gas in their eagerness to condemn him.
This is one example of several contradictions found when the
summation is compared to the verbal evidence. The Commission
distorted evidence from witness to witness to suit their convictions. In
their summation the Commissioners accepted both Ross' and Rowan's
alleged ignorance of the role of coaldust as a result of the dearth of
scientific publications on the subject, even though both had admitted to a
full knowledge of the dangers of coaldust during their examination [74],
In contrast, the miners were considered reckless if they were guilty of
even the smallest oversight.
Despite overwhelming evidence against Ross, Rowan and
M ackenzie their credibility was almost unassailable. Examiner
Mackenzie's flight of fancy concerning his dynamite plot was the only
rejection by the Commission of major evidence given by both
Government and company witnesses. Clearly, the Commission ignored
the fact that according to the CMRA, the ultimate responsibility lay with
managers and Department of Mines officials. The condemnation of
miners completed an exercise in bureaucratic evasion of responsibility,
begun by the Government to subvert justice and to save money. The
miners could not rely on the expertise of their peers, neither could they
rely on their ineffectual union, decimated by the prolonged 1886-87
strike/lock-out, nor its discredited secretary: Nor could the miners redress
the blame attributed to them, as Royal Commissioners are immune from
civil or criminal proceedings under law [75]. Witnesses, however, did
not receive the same protection under the law and could be required to
appear by summons, and fined for refusing to answer questions.
The Royal Commissioners used the powers given to them by law
selectively to discriminate against the miners. The result was a
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judgement in favour of the interlocking interests of state and capital. The 
judgement also allowed an ineffectual Department of Mines inspectorate 
to continue to administer an equally ineffective Coal Mines Regulation 
Act.
Bulli mining disaster 1887
C  O’
CHAPTER SIX
6 The Department of Mines and the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1876
The Act is a perfect paradise for lawyers and a thorough failure 
(Mr. Thompson, acting for the Department of Mines against 
Brown's Minmi mine, 1882 (Votes and Proceedings, 1887-88, 
(8): 220).
The deliberations of the Royal Commission provoked an angry 
response among the mining communities. Newspapers took up the cause 
with articles recommending greater government supervision and stricter 
vigilance by Department of Mines officers. Also, the 1876 CMRA came 
under close scrutiny and was found wanting. These are not surprising 
reactions as the Act was originally framed by a legislative body 
comprising several mine owners. These parliamentary coal mine 
proprietors had restricted legislation which would have imposed heavy 
costs in the provision of safety measures.
An investigation [ 1 ] of the financial interests of parliamentarians 
in 1876 indicates that 5 of the 10 man Ministry which introduced the Bill 
were either owners or directors of coal mines. The Premier of the time, 
Mr. John Robertson, and Mr. Alexander Stuart, the Colonial Treasurer, 
were co-owners of the Coalcliff Colliery. Mr. Thomas Garrett, Secretary 
for Lands had extensive holdings in mines throughout the colony and Mr. 
John Lucas, the Minister for Mines, was a director of several coalmines 
while Mr. John Fitzgerald Bums, Postmaster-General, also held 
directorship of several coalmining companies and companies in 
associated industries. The Legislative Council, comprising 38 members, 
accounted for no less than 14 known owners or directors of coal mines. 
The 68 member Legislative Assembly accounted for another 20 known 
coalmine owners and directors, and a further three members were active 
in companies in industries associated with coal mining. Even the 
Governor, Sir Hercules Robinson, had direct interests in coal.
N ot surprisingly, the 1876 CMRA was accepted only after being 
delayed in the Assembly by numerous readings, amendments and 
committee meetings; it was then returned from the Council with several
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amendments [2]. The subsequent 1896 CMRA, which was first 
introduced in 1889, partly as a reaction to the Bulli disaster, shared a 
similar, albeit more tortuous passage in Parliament. This ill-fated Bill, 
despite the obvious deficiencies of the 1876 CMRA, was read and rejected 
several times, referred to numerous select committees, underwent a Royal 
Commission and finally given assent after seven years [3],
A great weakness of the 1876 CMRA was that it did not give 
Department of Mines officers the precise power of prosecution. 
Notwithstanding, officers made full use of loopholes in the Act to their 
advantage. Once the Act was established few authorities, apart from the 
Department of Mines, ensured that the Act was adequately observed. The 
inspectorate's pronouncements were almost unchallenged and its 
judgements invariably endorsed at ministerial level.
The only challenge to the inspectorate's mandate came from 
miners, who under the CMRA were entitled to appoint check-inspectors, 
who could check inspection results of both the Department of Mines and 
management each month and record their findings in a report book [4], 
Superficially, the assignment of these powers to miners appears 
benevolent, but the process was difficult to implement in practice. 
Managers were empowered under the same regulation of the CMRA to 
accompany check-inspectors on their inspections although the resence of 
a mine manager was frequently an intimidating influence on the check- 
inspector. At the Bulli mine the possibility of being dismissed under No.
6 of the Special Rules and the added inconvenience of miners having to 
contribute to the wages of the check-inspectors from their own income 
forestalled the implementation of the check-inspector scheme [5].
The Department of Mines was autonomous, almost a law unto 
itself. The Department consisted of several independent sub-departments 
representing various metalliferous branches, a geological branch, as well 
as the Coalfields Branch, each led by a permanent executive officer. 
These officers were responsible to the Under Secretary, and through this 
line of command to the Secretary or Minister of Mines. The Minister 
responsible for mines in 1887 was Mr. Francis Abigail, who had taken on 
this hapless position only a few months prior to the Bulli disaster. 
Abigail's lack of mining expertise is understandable as he was a boot 
manufacturer by vocation [6], However, despite being misled by
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unreliable officers, even when proof existed of their dereliction of duty, 
this was overlooked [7].
At the inspectorate level, inspector Rowan and examiner 
M ackenzie either knowingly or unknowingly failed to perform their 
assigned tasks. These two officers gave tacit approval of practices which 
contravened the CMRA, and this alone is a damning indictment of the 
Coalfields Branch of the Department of Mines in the light of the fact that 
they represented one half of its entire inspectorate. The whole of the 
Colony o f N.S.W. was represented by only three inspectors and one 
examiner. Ultimately, Mackenzie was responsible for the lives of more 
than 8,000 miners in N.S.W. in 1887.
Because of the tremendous responsibility associated with his 
duties, Mackenzie's annual income in 1876 was £600 which was 
increased by £50 by 1887 [8]. In addition, he received travelling 
expenses and was allowed to accept payment for surveys he undertook 
from private mining concerns. From the latter source, Mackenzie 
received an additional £1,800 in the period 1871 to 1876 [9]. This 
lucrative supplement to his official income placed him in the invidious 
position of having to enforce the CMRA against proprietors who had 
previously employed him as a surveyor. Mackenzie's only predicament 
was when he had to invoke the CMRA against the members of parliament 
who owned or had interests in coalmines.
The one way the examiner's position could be endangered was 
by incurring parliamentary censure. Under the CMRA, the examiner 
could only be sacked by the Governor in conjunction with the Executive 
Council [10]. Like parliamentarians, Mackenzie was supposed to uphold 
the law even if the law worked against personal and financial interests. 
However, it appears that Mackenzie made use of his position to evade as 
many legal obstacles as possible. There is also evidence of one instance 
of collusion between Mackenzie and parliamentarians [11]. Mackenzie's 
situation was especially compromised when he was required to pass 
judgement during the Bulli Inquest and Royal Commission on the Hon. 
G. A. Lloyd, M.L.C. and a director of the Bulli Coal Mining Company for 
whom Mackenzie had performed private surveys [12].
Abigail, perhaps lamenting the examiner's political connections, 
or perhaps because of their mutual collusion, refused to set into motion
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the necessary parliamentary action to dismiss Mackenzie, even though 
Mackenzie's misconduct was known to him by 1887. Abigail was forced 
to defend Mackenzie during various parliamentary assaults made on the 
Department of Mines and its policies by those few parliamentarians who 
took up the miners' cause. Ironically, Abigail was engaged in 1887 in a 
Supreme Court litigation against Mackenzie, who contrary to the CMRA, 
was a proprietor o f a coalmine [13]. Section 27 of the CMRA had been 
included as a measure to address the absurd situation of having an official 
enforce the law against his own coalmine [14], Abigail did not force the 
examiner to resign or to sell his coalmine. Instead, when Mackenzie’s 
crime had been discovered, he replied in Parliament as follows:
(a)s soon as the Supreme Court has given a decision, the
Examiner of Coalfields will have to give up his interest in the
mine [15],
Because of Mackenzie's coal mining interests, a prolonged 
campaign against Mackenzie and Abigail was conducted in Parliament by 
Mr. Ninian Melville [16]. That this action was justified is supported by 
Mackenzie's conduct during the Bulli inquest and Royal Commission. 
Melville initially began criticizing Mackenzie in 1885 because he had not 
rectified blatant ventilation deficiencies in the Northern district. Also, 
Melville claimed that Mackenzie had surveyed and then allowed mining 
to proceed so close to the surface that the main road from Lambton and 
Waratah to W allsend had collapsed [17], The mine was owned by 
Thomas Croudace. Melville renewed his intimidating stance toward 
Mackenzie when die examiner provided startling and controversial 
evidence during the Bulli inquest.
After several witnesses had testified at the inquest that the 
explosion had occurred in No. 2 heading, Mackenzie as the last witness 
claimed that the explosion had been caused by dynamite elsewhere in the 
mine. This sudden contradiction of evidence so startled the gathering that 
the coroner immediately adjourned the inquest to the Bulli pit for further 
investigation. When the court resumed sitting, Mackenzie held that an 
original explosion had taken place in the main tunnel, 374 yards from the 
mine adit and that the explosion in No. 2 heading had only been a 
secondary explosion as a consequence of the first [18]. He claimed that
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dynamite had been set off deliberately, by a person or persons for 
revenge. Mackenzie was hinting at the viciousness of the warfare 
between miners and blacklegs, although he was not explicit in making 
this claim. Because of the radical nature of this evidence, Mackenzie was 
forced to explain himself in a report ordered by Parliament to investigate 
his evidence. Not even the Royal Commission, despite its prejudice 
against miners, believed Mackenzie's absurd dynamite hypothesis, and 
the Commissioners concurred that '(t)he suggestion of explosives infers 
malice of no ordinary kind' [19]. The examiner, trying to salvage his 
reputation after reading the report of the Royal Commission, replied in 
response to accusations made against him in Parliament claiming that:
(o)ur gaols are filled with criminals who have given play to 
"malice of no ordinary kind" - ships have been sunk, buildings 
have been burnt and blown up, railway trains have been upset, 
murders of all kinds have been committed, and collieries have 
been set on fire and subjected to other disasters, all from malice 
aforethought time out of mind, and the like will happen again 
until the Millenium [,v/c| arrives. And with regard to arson in 
connection with coal-mining, it was found necessary to pass an 
Act in England, in 1736, providing that any person who "wilfully 
and maliciously set on fire, or caused to be set on fire, any mine, 
pit, or delph of coal, or cannel coal, and being thereby lawfully 
convicted, shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall suffer 
death, as in cases of felony, without benefit of clergy" [20]. 
Mackenzie's need to cling to the dynamite theory was 
compounded by his social position and his concern for his damaged 
reputation. He supported the technical aspect of his dynamite theory with 
an interpretation of the manner of derangement of the props and the 
position of the door of the Western Main tunnel junction. Because props 
had been found lying in all directions, he held that the proximity of the 
tunnel mouth was the point of explosion [21]. During the inquest and the 
Royal Commission he had supported this evidence with the type of 
damage and position of the Western junction door, which had been blown 
30 yards inbye [22]. After a period of initial surprise by experts at the 
inquest, the Royal Commission had gathered sufficient evidence to show 
that the recoil o f the explosion in No. 2 heading had caused the 
disarranging of the props and the inward dislocation of the door [23],
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Diagnoses of mine explosions before and after 1887 show that 
explosion recoil will cause the type of chaos like that found at Bulli. It 
appears that Mackenzie was either ignorant of, or chose to ignore 
nineteenth century scientific work on the effects of recoil in mine 
explosions. W. N. and J. B. Atkinson's Explosions in Coal Mines, is one 
textbook which was available in 1887 [24] and describes in detail the 
results of recoil in a mine explosion.
Mackenzie's dynamite plot was further tested by the 
Commissioners because they held that no one could place and fire 
explosives without being seen in the busiest part of the mine during the 
busiest part of the day [25]. Furthermore, testimony had recorded that no 
one came out of the mine in the one and a half hours before the explosion 
[26]. Mackenzie's luckless saboteur had suicidal tendencies as he must 
have perished by his own actions. Nevertheless, the Commission did not 
implicate Mackenzie in any manner, although his dynamite theory was a 
fabrication. Even when it was discovered during a cross examination that 
he could not define the precise nature of the examiner's duties as 
delineated under the CMRA, the Commissioners neglected to criticise his 
incompetence, in fact, they did not even mention 4it. It appears they 
castigated his hypothesis only to avert further parliamentary and press 
criticism. They dismissed Mackenzie's folly without any reference to his 
neglect of duty. The Commission failed to discover any:
cogent reasons to support this remarkable propositions of Mr.
Mackenzie, or any circumstance that can justify the enunciation
of such views [27],
Columnists, in their press reports after the revelation of the 
dynamite hypothesis, sniggered at the examiner. The Illawarra 
Mercury reported Mr. Ninian Melville's speech made at the Railway 
Hotel, Bulli, in which he gleefully intimated to an appreciative crowd that 
'(s)ome Guy Fawks [sic] had got into the district and blown the mine up’
[28], Jibes were frequently made about the examiner's conduct during the 
inquest and Royal Commission. Melville accused the examiner of being 
always 'three-parts drunk', a fool, a scoundrel and a murderer [29], An 
editorial in the Illawarra Mercury proclaimed that:
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Mr. Mackenzie on his part did not appear to have "favourably 
impressed" the Commission, as his pet theory is shattered to 
atoms - ... it now appears that this gentleman (who bye-the-bye 
holds no certificate of competency and who strange to say was 
elevated to the most responsible position in the Mines 
Department notwithstanding his circumstance) contemplates 
retiring from his position-probably on a pension [30],
The motivation for Mackenzie's bent for the dynamite theory seems quite 
malevolent when it is considered that the source of his information was 
Mr. G. Hamilton, the general manager of the Bulli Coal Mining 
Company. Hamilton had placed one of the company's steamships, the 
Woonona, at Mackenzie's disposal to bring him from Sydney to the 
inquest a t Bulli. During the journey Hamilton had suggested to 
Mackenzie that he had heard from an unspecified source that dynamite 
had caused the explosion [31].
Both Mackenzie and Hamilton could only profit if the blame was 
attributed to miners instead of the company. The Department of Mines 
also would appear in a better light if miners were blamed. Mackenzie's 
gain would be the guarantee of a lucrative source of employment as a 
surveyor, a duty he had performed for the company in the past. 
Hamilton's benefit would be the possible waiver of the large compulsory 
payments made to the victims' relatives under the Employers' Liability 
Act o f 1886 [32].
The Bulli Coal Mining Company had been running at a loss 
during the fiscal year of 1886-1887, and required an additional 
subscription to a new share issue [33]. The bad publicity that would 
result from proven culpability would have frightened away the much 
needed new investors. In short, the company would face ruin. An article 
appearing in the Daily Telegraph the day after the Bulli disaster, alleged 
that the use of deceptive measures of this kind was common to the 
coalmining industry. The article stated:
(t)here has been, it is alleged, by those who are supposed to be 
competent authorities an unworthy attempt to throw dust in the 
eyes of the public and create an unsound sense of security on the 
part o f innocent spectators (who have capital to lose but much 
experience to gain) by the endeavour to establish unwarranted 
confidence in the safety of working our coal seams [34],
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Despite the tactics of both Hamilton and Mackenzie, the Bulli 
inquest jury found in favour of the miners. The wide publication of the 
jury's verdict cast suspicion over the activities and competencies of the 
Department of Mines and the Bulli Coal Mining Company. Although the 
verdict did not incriminate Mackenzie directly, he felt that its biased 
nature assailed his professional standing in the community [35], 
Accordingly, he strongly attacked any opponent of his dynamite theory. 
As a result of Mackenzie's prolonged argument on this subject, Melville 
continued to question the examiner's mining expertise. The criticism of 
his mining proficiency seemed to be well founded. However, a 
parliamentary report of 1887-8 investigating Mackenzie's conduct came 
to the opposite conclusion. Copies of references supplied by the 
examiner to counteract the accusations made by Melville, reveal that 
Mackenzie had obtained the necessary qualifications to assume the 
responsibility of the position of examiner in England [36], Even so, it 
would appear that Mackenzie had an obvious preference for a lucrative 
private practice, as opposed to his required official duties.
In defence of charges of neglecting his duties, Mackenzie 
remonstrated that he and his inspectors had to cope with too many duties. 
The examiner's protests were partially justified. There* were only three 
inspectors and Mackenzie had to supervise 74 mines and 8,118 men in 
1887 [37], However, instead of easing the problem of staff shortage, 
Mackenzie compounded the matter by utilising a curious territorial 
division. Inspector Rowan had 32 out of the 74 mines in the Colony 
under his supervision, including the Western as well as the Southern 
coalfields. Inspector John Dixon and inspector Thomas Bates shared the 
remaining 42 mines which were in the Northern district, with Mackenzie 
inspecting none. Clearly, a better territorial distribution would have 
alleviated some of the examiner's problems in regard to staff shortage.
Mackenzie's repeated reference to the deficiencies of the 1876 
CMRA cannot be attributed entirely to parliamentarians as he claimed. 
He and his inspectors were consulted during the passage of the Bill and 
were asked to contribute towards its formulation in parliament [38]. 
Mackenzie's acknowledgement of staff shortage and weakness in the Act 
should have made him more aware of the necessity for more thorough 
inspections. He could have relieved the staffing situation by inspecting
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some mines himself. Indeed, he was required under the CMRA to make 
such inspections, a task which he felt was beneath the dignity of his high 
position [39], Instead, the examiner chose to rely on second hand and 
sometimes incorrect information from his inspectors as he seldom visited 
the mines in his capacity as examiner [40], In the instance of the Bulli 
colliery Mackenzie's vital knowledge of gas and ventilation had been 
based entirely on the inadequate inspections of inspector Rowan, who in 
turn had used the equally uninformed manager, Alexander Ross [41].
The element of truth in Mackenzie's denunciation of the Act was 
the role parliamentarians had played in its creation. In addition, 
successive governments since 1876 had neglected to provide adequate 
financial means to employ officers and purchase the equipment required 
for the Act's implementation. Quite clearly, four men could not have 
protected more than 8,000 lives in more than 70 locations. Mackenzie 
was severely criticised because of his ready admission of his 
unwillingness and inability to inspect mines. When he reiterated his 
unwillingness to make mine inspections at the Royal Commission [42], 
the Illawarra Mercury concluded that:
(i)t would be interesting to know what Mr. M'Kenzie [sic] 
actually does for the fat salary he draws, and from what sources 
other than the Inspectors he obtains his information on mining 
matters. Certainly not from personal observation. This highly 
paid but little worked official actually visited the mine a week 
before the explosion-nay more he was inside the mine-and 
though he was aware that gas was giving off and was well aware 
o f the danger therefrom, he did not think it his duty as Examiner 
o f Coalfields, to go into the gassy section to see for himself, if 
the ventilation was sufficient to cope with the gas giving off
[43],
The Bulli disaster continued to be the lowest ebb of Mackenzie's career as 
he persisted in his vituperous defense campaign. In support of his 
dynamite hypothesis in a reply to the parliamentary report held to 
investigate his conduct, he cited miners and their unions as the real 
culprits of the Bulli mine explosion, stating:
... I wish to point out that there is a peculiarity in reference to the 
administration of the Coal Mines Regulation Act which does not
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appear to be realised or understood by the general public. In no 
branch of the Civil Service are officials subjected to such direct 
and persistent criticism from outside sources as the Examiner 
and Inspectors of Collieries. By the very nature of their duties 
they are thrust between two contending elements that are ever 
wrangling and jarring with each other-capital and labour. Do 
what they may, it is impossible for them to escape 
animadversion, for in every dispute which they are called upon 
to investigate they are met with the consciousness that whatever 
decisions they may pronounce they must give dissatisfaction to 
one side or the other. The records of the office constantly show 
this. If they challenge malpractices on the part of the owners or 
managers, appeals are constantly made to the Minister, coupled 
with passionate remonstrances, sometimes suggesting improper 
motives, and nearly always charging officers with unnecessary 
interference and officiousness. If complaints come from the 
miners, and upon investigation some of them are found to be 
frivolous, and not deserving of any serious notice, the officers 
are denounced with either neglect of duty, incompetence or 
corruption, in language plentifully sprinkled with the vilest 
epithets which insolence, ingenuity, or malice can invent. There 
is no organisation of labour which is knitted together, and which 
has such special privileges, as that of the coalminers. No other 
class of artisans are able, as they are, through the inevitable 
concentration of their numbers, to return Members of Parliament 
specially to represent them, and no other mechanics are able to 
maintain such internal organisation as they possess. It seems to 
be an idea among them that the only way to keep Government 
officials at the highest pitch of tension in the performance of 
their duties is to be perpetually finding fault with them, and so 
officials are subjected, with or without reason, to a never ceasing 
carping criticism. Every mine has a recognised coterie of his 
own, whose business it is to settle petty details. These coteries 
join in forming district councils, and the whole merge in a 
combined association, with paid officials, whose business in life 
is to show the necessity of their employment by exhibiting real 
or pretended vigilance in the interest of those who employ them. 
Their paid mission is to find fault and stir up every conceivable 
form of agitation, and he is naturally accepted as the most 
worthy of confidence who can hunt up most subjects o f dispute 
and scold in the strongest language and with the loudest lungs
[44],
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Mackenzie's social and political inclinations became apparent in 
this harangue, and they must have played an important part in his role 
during the inquest and the Royal Commission. Not only was the 
unfortunate examiner harassed by unrelenting union officials, but he also 
found that in nearly every Northern colliery miners had observed Section 
30 of the CMRA and appointed check-inspectors, who w ere '... ever on the 
watch in the endeavour to find Government officials tripping ...' [45]. 
According to Mackenzie, miners need not have feared any retribution on 
his part. His defence to the accusations continued thus:
I am acquainted with the idiosyncrasies of miners, and it is 
perhaps because I know them so well, and they are aware that I 
know them, that I am so frequently subjected to evidences of the 
disfavour of their leaders [46],
Mackenzie tried to conceal his prejudice against the miners by 
demonstrating that he had often prosecuted managers for breaches of the 
CMRA. This was a feeble defensive ploy as evidence shows that most of 
the offending managers only paid a trifling fine and continued to flout the 
Act with the implicit blessing of the Department [47], The real bane of 
coalmining companies was the closure o f mines, an this action was only 
once resorted to by Mackenzie and his inspectors during the period 
described in this book. This situation occurred with the threatened 
closure of the Coalcliff Colliery as a direct result of the Department of 
Mines' bad publicity six weeks after the Bulli disaster. Inspector Rowan 
had recommended that Coalcliff Colliery be closed down because of a 
dangerous subsidence of the surface near the pit entrance [48], So 
unusual was this reaction by the Department of Mines that former 
adversaries, the miners and owners of the Coalcliff pit, formed a 
deputation to convince Mr. Abigail, the Minister responsible, to 
countermand the closure order. Abigail commented that:
(t)he officers of the Department had been severely censured in 
certain quarters for neglect of their duty, and this had woke them 
up to a sense of greater anxiety to fulfill their duty [49].
In reply to a question in the Parliament by Ninian Melville, 
Abigail agreed to table a report of Mackenzie's prosecution of J. Y. 
Neilson, the former Royal Commissioner [50], For the sake of
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appearance, Mackenzie had prosecuted Neilson as if to prove his zeal and 
his impartiality in his dealings with both miners and managers. The real 
object o f Mackenzie's prosecution of Neilson, it seems, was that it 
afforded him an opportunity to gain a measure of revenge against a 
person who had assailed his dynamite theory. Although Neilson had not 
explicitly ridiculed Mackenzie's dynamite plot, Mackenzie held that 
Neilson's criticism was implied because of Neilson's contribution to the 
summation delivered by the Commissioners [51].
Abigail's cooperation with a request made by Melville to table 
the report of The Crown versus The Newcastle Coal Company did not 
have the effect that either Abigail or Mackenzie wanted. Abigail's 
contrived cooperation was in part due to his objection to the magistrate's 
criticism of the Department of Mines and because he had demanded an 
apology from the Department of Justice. Once the transcript of the court 
case was tabled, rather than saving the reputations of the Department of 
Mines and Mackenzie, it further harmed them. The presiding magistrate, 
Mr. Robert J. Perrott not only criticised Mackenzie for his dereliction of 
duty at Neilson's Wallsend mine, but also virtually accused both 
Mackenzie and Rowan of being responsible for the explosion at Bulli.
Yet, apart from a fine of £1, Neilson was only mildly 
reprimanded by the magistrate. On the other hand, Mackenzie, who had 
to take Neilson to court because the CMRA had no provision for 
prosecution under its own auspices, was rebuked severely by the 
magistrate. To Perrott's amazement no arrangements had been made by 
Mackenzie to remove miners from a gaseous section of the Wallsend 
mine as required by Section 12 of the CMRA [52]. Neilson, who had 
been critical o f the ventilation at the Bulli mine during the Commission, 
permitted a far more serious ventilation deficiency in his mine. Between 
Mackenzie's and inspector Dixon's original inspections on 5 January 1888 
and Dixon's subsequent visit 20 days later, miners had continued to work 
even though Mackenzie had full knowledge of the emission of several 
blowers [53], Evidence indicated that one day before the hearing on 7 
March, 1888, the mine was still in the same gas laden condition [54[. 
Perrott's denunciation of Mackenzie was fully justified.
Inspector Dixon stated under examination in court that '(o)n the 
5th. of January the mine was dangerous and defective and tending to the
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bodily injuries of the persons working there’ [55], Yet Mackenzie, 
indifferent to the situation, did not perceive any immediate danger. To 
Perrott's consternation, Mackenzie had inspected the gaseous section with 
a naked light [56]. Magistrate Perrott found that neither the inspector nor 
the examiner, 'took the cause laid down by law where a mine is 
dangerous' [57]. During this case there was frequent mention of the 
laissez-faire attitude at Bulli by officials of the Department of Mines and 
by managers and officials of the Bulli Coal Mining Company. Speaking 
for the defence, Mr. Want became so enraged by the mention of Bulli that 
he exclaimed:
(i)t seems to me your worship that there is a great amount of 
feeling being imported in this case. Bulli, Bulli, Bulli!, 
to which the magistrate retorted:
(i)f danger existed in the mine, it was quite right that the 
Inspectors warned by the accident at Bulli should have attention 
drawn to it.
Mr. Edmunds for the prosecution said:
(c)ertainly your worship, the officers would not be doing their 
duty unless they were made more active and watchful by this 
Bulli accident.
To which Perrott replied:
I have read a great deal about this Bulli accident and I have 
come to the conclusion that great catastrophe would not have 
occurred if these men had done their duty [58],
It seems that the magistrate's impeachment of Mackenzie and his 
subordinates was a trenchant criticism which should have also been 
levelled at the administrators as well as the creators of the 1876 CMRA. 
Parliamentarians and agents of this legislation stood by in an unconcerned 
manner until the events of Bulli precipitated a situation which forced 
them to reflect on their past inactivity. The CMRA required only a small 
fine for a serious breach of the kind committed by Neilson. No charges 
had been laid against those responsible for the disaster at Bulli and not 
even the horror of that event prompted alterations to rectify the glaring 
deficiencies in the CMRA.
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An editorial in the Daily Telegraph one week after the Bulli 
disaster ominously forecast this continued sham, stating that it was:
to be feared however, that too much confidence has been placed 
in the supposed absence of explosive gas in our coal mines. Nay 
more as we pointed out on a former occasion this over­
confidence has purposely been fostered and encouraged by a 
certain class of interested persons, for reasons which will be 
obvious to those acquainted with the subject. Any attempt to 
create a "scare" has invariably been put down with the strong 
hand of authority [59],
It seems that the parliamentary system was infiltrated with coal interests 
to such an extent that little or any remedial action was forthcoming from 
Macquarie Street. In addition, a false sense of safety permeated the entire 
coalmining industry. Miners believed that they were working in a safe 
industry. Other than the protection of their investment it was not in the 
interest of coalmine owners to observe the CMRA to the letter. During 
the nineteenth century injury or death did not place the legal obligations 
on them which would eventuate with the evolution of workers' 
compensation legislation during the twentieth century. Disasters of the 
magnitude of Bulli were unknown. Consequently, with regard to their 
investment in technology and property coalmine owners played a Russian 
roulette. Despite their callous disregard for life, substantially these 
judgements were very shrewd. During the nineteenth century Bulli was 
the only large scale disaster. During the twentieth century, with the 
exception of the Mt. Kembla accident, mining disasters resulting in the 
deaths of large numbers of miners have also been rare. The Department 
of Mines inspectorate was unable or unwilling to enforce legislation 
which was inherently weak in any event. The depressing conclusion is 
that the false sense of security miners had about their work surroundings 
and work practices not only endangered their own lives, but also became 
an article of faith. The watered down coalmining legislation that passed 
through Parliament by the actions of parliamentary coalmine owners 
legitimated the unsafe practices that became part of coalmining.
<0 --------------
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CHAPTER SEVEN
7 Lessons from the Past
As the evidence of Mackenzie's prosecution of Neilson indicates, 
the immediate impact of the Bulli disaster within the coalmining 
fraternity was short-lived and minimal. In terms of making any 
significant impact on the coal mining industry, the lessons learnt from the 
Bulli disaster were few. Naked lights were re-introduced in the Bulli 
mine before 1890 and only 12 years later similar circumstances 
contributed to the Mt. Kembla disaster. Such events were the norm and a 
cursory review of selected events in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries reinforces the contention that actions intended to 
make coal mines safer were largely cosmetic in nature. Unsafe work 
practices continued to flourish and legislative changes made little impact 
on conditions - and unsafe workplace behaviour persisted. During this 
period official inquiries seemed to have little impact. Even in the latter 
half of the twentieth century few changes were made in coalmines in 
order to make them safer workplaces. In fac t unsafe work practices, 
either maintained or tolerated by many involved in the coalmining 
industry, had become so institutionalised that no amount of legislative 
change, official inquiry or dedication to duty by Department of Mines 
officials could make coalmines safe working places.
During the 1890s, despite an obvious need for improved safety 
precautions, legislative change was slow. Even so, as a result of changes 
in key personnel within the Department of Mines there was an attempt to 
improve safety measures. Although long overdue, the 1896 CMRA was a 
vast improvement over the 1876 Act. Furthermore, the departure of 
Mackenzie and others from the Coal Fields Branch had an effect on the 
Branch in the execution of its duties. Nevertheless, the new inspectorate 
was not sufficiently committed to making the necessary improvements in 
coalmining which may have prevented the Mt. Kembla disaster of 1902. 
The new chief inspector, Alfred Atkinson, was appointed in 1897. He 
was determined to enforce the new legislation. However, inspections of 
coalmines were few and far between. The 1896 Act, which had
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provisions to pursue the prosecution of managers, was easily evaded. 
Furthermore, owing to the long legacy of the neglect of safety issues, the 
coalmining industry had become very resistant to change. As a result, 
progress was minimal. Although Atkinson persisted he only managed to 
secure minor and, arguably, cosmetic changes, even though these 
modifications were significant given the mining industry's resistance to 
change. For example, most probably out of recognition that the primitive 
and isolated nature of most mines precluded speedy medical services, 
Atkinson instigated a scheme in 1897 under which miners were trained in 
first-aid. The New South Wales Government Ambulance Corps 
administered the course and drew on the experience of Atkinson as one of 
its advisers and utilised medical practitioners as instructors. In the 
Southern district the first classes were held at Bulli and attracted 38 
students of whom 20 gained certificates [1].
Atkinson also vigorously prosecuted managers and owners for 
all offences including those not related to safety [2], Atkinson was 
particularly zealous in the execution of his duties in cases such as the gas 
and coal-dust explosion at the Dudley colliery at Newcastle on 21 March 
1898 which resulted in the loss of 15 lives. Subsequent to the mandatory 
Coroner's Inquest, the large loss of life as a result of the explosion was 
investigated further by a parliamentary inquiry under a special provision 
of the 1896 CMRA [3]. Headed by a well known barrister and later 
N.S.W. premier, G. C. Wade, the inquiry obscured the role of the 
management and the district inspector in relation to the unsafe ventilation 
of the mine. Rather than make public the weakness of the ventilation at 
Dudley which resulted in the accumulation of gas, the evidence showed 
that the ventilation was conducted in the same defective way as it had 
been at Bulli [4], At Dudley, as at Bulli, the efficiency of the ventilation 
was also entirely dependent on sets of single regulating doors which were 
placed irresponsibly on main transport roads which also served as the 
main ventilation intakes. In such circumstances, these doors were 
frequently opened to let the sets of skips through, resulting in the 
dispersal of ventilated air. The ventilation was neither conducted 
properly to the face [5] nor were inspections conducted ' ... in accordance 
with General Rule 4' [6].
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That such irresponsible behaviour continued at Dudley despite 
Atkinson's genuine desire to improve safety is not surprising. The 
industry's entire economic well-being depended on what can be termed as 
a 'conspiracy of complacency' which was ascribed to by owners, 
managers, subordinate officials and Department of Mines inspectors. It 
was also reflected in the conduct of contract and day-wage workers [7], 
The principal ethos of the coalmining industry was to produce as much as 
possible with the regard for life and limb subject to this economic 
prerogative. Indeed, even off-hand labourers' wages depended on the 
number of days miners worked because they were paid by the day and 
were laid off on those days when no coal was required [8], Even after the 
1901 N.S. W. Industrial Arbitration Act all mineworkers tried to produce 
more under the mistaken assumption that increasing amounts of coal 
maintained high prices. In reality, what they were doing had the opposite 
effect. Despite the industry's aversion to stockpiling, the greater the 
productivity the cheaper the price of coal became which in turn placed 
pressure on the rates for hewers and other contract workers to decrease. 
Until the N.S.W. coalmining industry's predisposition to over-produce 
ceased with the outbreak of World War II, for all mineworkers, over­
production meant the industry was characterised by intermittent 
employment.
The disregard of safety by contract workers in general and 
hewers in particular remained a prominent feature of daily routine - as 
described above, time was money. Consequently, out of economic 
necessity the playing down of danger became commonplace and the 
acceptance of danger was regarded as a normal part of work. 
Transgressions against safety regulations were frequent and when these 
were reported they were punished with indifference, generally with the 
imposition of a small fine. In a similar vein, the disregard of gas and 
other dangerous occurrences was simply shrugged off by management 
and men as mundane features of working life. As a result, the lessons 
from the past in terms of safety issues were rarely heeded. Dangerous 
practices became such a normal part of the daily work routine that they 
were passed on from generation to generation. This tradition, maintained 
in the close-knit coalmining communities of N.S.W. until the 1950s, was 
reinforced through the custom of sons following their fathers into the
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same mine. Even after the creation of the Joint Coal Board in 1947, when 
the coalmining workforce was increasingly drawn from non-traditional 
mining communities, work practices forged over more than a century 
persisted [9]. O f course, this normalisation of danger contained the 
potential for disaster. Even at the time of writing, a bravado persists 
among many in the coalmining industry which has the ingredients for 
calamity. The belief in the modernity and efficiency of ventilation, 
reinforced by a misplaced sense of security, led to the explosion of an 
accumulation of gas at the M t Kembla mine in 1902 and the Appin mine 
in 1979. Similar attitudes can be attributed as causes of the Bulli 
explosion of 1887 and the Stockton disaster of 1896. At the Stockton 
colliery near Newcasde at the time the 1896 Bill was completing its 
tortuous passage through Parliament, an emission of non-explosive gas 
asphyxiated and killed two men on 2 December. On the following day 
black-damp killed another nine miners [10]. Rather than following a 
course of inquiry based on the 'blaming the victim' syndrome, the 
Stockton inquests are notable because like the Bulli inquest they did not 
find fault with the actions of the miners. The Stockton inquests caused a 
furore because the result of the second inquest was not the usual trite 
'accidental death' verdict, although the first inquest jury had decided on 
the stock-in-trade verdict of accidental death. As a result of the Bulli 
inquest, under the 1896 Act both juries were precluded from being chosen 
from employees or management [11], However, relatives of victims and 
local business people serving miners or management were not 
disqualified. This leaves some doubt concerning the loyalty of either 
party to management or miners - a complication which would have had a 
bearing on the inquest outcomes. What is deserving of attention is that 
not even a community in which violent deaths were commonplace and a 
community which wholeheartedly subscribed to the blame the victim 
syndrome could blame the miners in the course of the second inquest. 
The jury was unable to agree and was discharged without a verdict being 
delivered. Doubts over managerial or governmental wrongdoings were 
quashed by a parliamentary inquiry.
The normalisation of danger underground was widespread. To 
die hewer the cutting and positioning of a sprag or the erection of a prop 
was dead work which prevented output. Omission of these essential
77
Bulli mining disaster 1887
safety precautions suited the hewers' and coalmine owners' mutual 
interest with owners considering timbering a necessary but onerous 
expense. The mutually beneficial 'cutting of comers' applied to a whole 
range of coalmining procedures. These were constantly modified, 
especially after the 1890s, in order to satisfy subsequent alterations in 
legislation and the changing demand in quality of coal. For example, 
after the turn of the century the previously forbidden practice of 
grunching or shooting coal out of the 'solid' without undercutting and 
nicking became permissible. Traditionally, grunching was a proscribed 
practice because it was considered dangerous by owners and the 
Department of Mines. It was also seen as 'uncraftsmanlike' by some 
miners. The supposed dangers attached to grunching were only a pretext 
in order to prevent the production of the then unsaleable slack, the line 
dust deemed unsuitable for coalbuming combustion chambers, which the 
method created in abundance. However, after the 1890s when a number 
of modifications were made to furnaces which enabled the burning of 
slack, for which miners were only paid a fraction of round coal, the 
dangers of grunching disappeared. In fact, later in the twentieth century 
grunching was encouraged and even legitimised by law in 'naked light 
mines’.
The conspiracy of complacency also brought about the 
circumstances that resulted in the Mt. Kembla disaster. Miners at Mt. 
Kembla were well aware of the laxity in safety procedures and that 
managers and other officials had not taken adequate precautions against 
the presence of explosive gas. One of the central issues discussed during 
the various inquiries into the Mt. Kembla disaster was whether or not the 
use of locked safety lamps should be enforced. However, there was 
opposition to this proposal from many quarters, including the miners 
themselves. In brief, aside from the explanations offered above, the 
universal introduction of safety lamps failed for a number of reasons. 
Although the interactions between miners and coalmine owners had 
altered little over the intervening fifteen years between the Bulli and Mt. 
Kembla disasters, the nature of parliamentary politics had changed and 
now appeared to be superficially in favour of miners. The Labor Party 
had been created and had entered the N.S.W. Parliament, with mixed 
success since 1891. However, many of its parliamentary members were
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former miners. Even so, the expedient nature of party politics, 
parliamentary delaying tactics and the rejection by miners of the use of 
safety lights as well as the coalmine owners' traditional opposition to the 
introduction of safety lamps on economic grounds or any other safety 
devices that required substantial monetary outlays all combined to impede 
the progress of legislation of any kind as a result of the M t Kembla 
disaster. In the words of Piggin and Lee, 'the killing would continue' 
[12].
In The Mt Kembla Disaster, Piggin and Lee (1992) contribute to 
the unmasking of the inadequacy of government inquiry and the 
shortcomings of coalmines legislation. They also highlight the need for 
further examination of government response in particular and the role of 
government in general in the creation and maintenance of safety 
regulation in coalmines. The Mt Kembla Disaster also demonstrates that 
until 1912 when an entirely new CMRA was enacted the lessons from the 
past were generally unheeded.
The benefits accruing from the 'conspiracy of complacency' were 
so pervasive that under 1876 and 1896 CMRA both management and 
miners schemed together to deceive Department of Mines inspectors 
when they were measuring ventilation [13] which was not supposed to 
fall below a minimum of one hundred cubic feet per minute for each man, 
boy and horse 114], However, owing to the unpredictability of furnace 
ventilation which was easily affected by temperature or wind changes, the 
quantity and quality of air frequently fluctuated [15]. To prevent their 
mine from being closed down until the ventilation was rectified, miners, 
with the knowledge of colliery officials, temporarily sealed off entire 
sections with brattice to augment the ventilation while the inspector 
measured the air current. Most probably the 'brattice trick' was employed 
in the Southern district until the late 1920s when the last large mine using 
furnace ventilation switched to engine driven fan ventilation like the other 
mines in the Illawarra area. These breakthroughs improved ventilation to 
such a degree that the brattice trick became redundant.
Collusion between managers and inspectors was rife. Most of 
these men came from England, Wales and Scotland and had either 
worked together in various capacities in their homeland or in N.S.W.. If 
they were properly certificated there was a strong possibility that they
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would have attended one of the few mining schools in Great Britain [16]. 
Although there was no provision in the 1896 CMRA or in subsequent 
legislation that required inspectors to make unannounced visits, 
frequently inspectors gave notice of an intended inspection a few days 
ahead of time in order to enable managers to get their mine in order. 
Today, inspectors are frequently appointed from the ranks of mine 
managers and it has been suggested that the practice of announcing 
intended inspections persists. Generally, it has been suggested that most 
mineworkers know when an inspector is due by the flurry of action to 
'clean up' the mine [17].
Due the remoteness of Department of Mines inspectors to 
everyday mining activity, the task of frequently inspecting mines is an 
arduous one. It is certainly probable that inspectors are unable to take 
account of infractions of regulations that may occur in their absence. In 
recent times, the equivocation of some inspectors when confronted with 
transgressions of the CMRA has earned them stinging 'nick-names' [181.
Deputies and overmen were the intermediary officials who 
mediated between management and mineworkers in the 'conspiracy of 
complacency'. Under the 1896 Act overmen and deputies were not 
explicitly recognised other than as 'competent persons' [19]. However, 
through the devolution of vicarious responsibility from the manager they 
were legally responsible for the general safety underground [20] and 
ostensibly were employed as safety officers. Their obligations by law 
were manifold, but commonly these were so subordinated to the 
supervision of labour and mine organisation that their safety duties were 
scarcely more than a cursory inspection of work places. By attempting to 
serve two masters, minor officials were enmeshed in a perennial struggle 
between the two necessary, but often conflicting roles. Despite the 
importance to owners of observing statutory obligations to protect 
property and life, a deputy's prime function was to maintain production. 
To accomplish this demanding task, deputies had to coordinate a wide 
range of a mine's essential functions. Under the 1896 Act the deputy's 
statutory duties began before day-shift with an inspection for gas and a 
test of the ventilation, roof and ribs of each workplace. The condition of 
the ventilation or any damage was supposed to be entered into a report 
book.
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Besides being answerable for the safety of the workplace before 
the commencement of the day shift, the deputy was also responsible for 
inspecting the ventilation, machinery below and above ground, the 
travelling shafts (if any) [21], the headgear and the chains and ropes [22], 
The deputy was also accountable for fencing-off any disused sections and 
was enjoined to prohibit anyone from entering gassy sections [23], If gas 
was detected regularly and the use of safetylamps enforced then the 
deputy was also responsible for their locking. The adherence to these and 
other safety precautions was accepted or rejected by management, 
generally as finances directed. The only pit in the Southern district where 
most of the Act was observed was the Metropolitan which in 1902 during 
the course of the Mt. Kembla inquiries was considered a marvel because 
D. A. W. Robertson, the manager, ‘enforced the use of locked 
safetylamps. At all the other Illawarra mines the use of safetylamps was 
not strictly enforced because of the extra 3d. per ton ]24] demanded by 
the miners for working under the dim, flickering, orange light given off 
by safetylamps. This arrangement was mutually acceptable, as owners 
were often unwilling to grant the additional payment and the miners 
claimed the light impeded their productivity.
Illawarra managers invariably appointed more than one deputy, 
an overman, a fireman to check the airways, a lampman to test the lamps, 
or simply a solitary deputy, or maybe a few in larger mines to meet the 
barest requirements of the law and to afford the minimum protection to 
their investment. After the deputy's morning statutory obligation, most of 
the day was absorbed by supervising duties which meant that the 
supplementary inspections required by the Act were often foregone [25].
The hub of mine production was the face. The economic 
viability of mines depended largely on the productivity of the hewers who 
not only had to be regularly serviced with skips but also supplied with 
'bridging rails', temporary skiprails, timber and brattice. The deputy, who 
was responsible for the delivery of these necessities also directed the men 
who bratticed, timbered and generally performed maintenance work 
outside and near the vicinity of working places. From the 1896 Act 
onward, in all mines determined gassy by the Department of Mines, a 
deputy or shotfirer also had to fire all shots. However, shotfirers were 
generally not employed in the Southern district until that position was
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made mandatory by the 1912 Act. O f course, it was unrealistic to expect 
that the deputy, who was burdened by all the other duties described 
above, would also have time to go on foot several times a day to 
workplaces which might be hundreds of yards apart in order to fire shots 
[26],
Any deputy or mine official who did not partake of the 
conspiracy of complacency was victimised. There were two cases of 
victimisation which merited special attention. In 1899 a Parliamentary 
inquiry under G. C. Wade investigated the dismissal of deputy Bailey 
from the Newcastle Coal Co. three days after he had detected firedamp. 
Wade found that the deputy had been instructed on a previous occasion 
not to report firedamp but added,'... that Bailey was dismissed for making 
known the existence of gas I am unable to say' [27]. In 1903 a Royal 
Commission investigated deputy Joseph Lowe's allegations concerning 
his dismissal after reporting gas at the Seaham colliery [28].
The subordination of safety by officials to the needs of 
production was a well established British custom practised in N.S.W. 
since the beginning of coalmining and implicitly legitimised in the 1876 
Act. Under this Act, neither manager, overman nor deputy were 
recognised, nor were their many duties specifically designated. The 
entire responsibility devolved from the owner to a vaguely defined agent 
[29], The paucity of legally enforceable safety regulations between 1876 
and 1896 for underground officials encouraged the growth of a 
recklessness which became an accepted part of coalmining. It spread as 
coalmining became a large industry from the late 1870s and was not 
entirely checked by the innocuous 1896 Act nor by any subsequent 
legislation in the twentieth century. In part this was due to the duality of 
the role of mine officials who were charged under law to protect the 
safety of life and limb, but who also had to ensure that the production 
process ran smoothly. Frequently, this would occur at the expense of 
safety. Under the 1912 CMRA deputies, shotfirers, undermanagers and 
managers continued to serve two masters whose objectives were 
antagonistic. There is no evidence which suggests that this situation has 
been resolved under current legislation.
W hile there is no doubt that the 1912 CMRA and its amendments 
were a vast improvement over any other Act that preceded it, the question
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of the process of observance of the 1912 legislation, which was in force 
as recently as 1984, is one that remains. Arguably, it could also be said 
that the present legislation, the 1982 CMRA, (proclaimed 1984), makes 
mines safer, although some critics claim that it gives too much latitude to 
managers in decisions where safety is a factor. Aside from the 
equivocations of inspectors, the inclination to internalise or normalise 
danger was as prevalent under the 1912 Act as it was under previous 
legislation. The tradition remains under current legislation. In part, 
current malpractices have a tradition as long as coalmining itself and 
many traditions have more recently been reinforced by the introduction of 
the production bonus in the mid- to late 1950s despite a change in the 
composition of the mining workforce since the end of World War II at the 
behest o f the Joint Coal Board. The contention here is that despite the 
strenuous opposition by the Miners' Federation to its introduction, since 
the 1960s introduction of the production bonus paid across the board to 
the majority of employees on mine sites, the tendency to overlook safety 
procedures has increased. An analysis o f accident rates tends to support 
this view. W hile there is no doubt that since its introduction the bonus 
has increased productivity prodigiously, it has also fostered a propensity 
to cut comers with respect to safety. The inclination to normalise danger, 
a characteristic embedded in all ranks of the mining workforce since the 
industry's inception, was again reinforced by the bonus. The result has 
been a fall in safety consciousness, abetted consciously or unconsciously 
by all who partake in the bonus - from the 'Feds' (members of the former 
Miners' Federation) to tradesmen, deputies and higher company officials. 
In other words, the conspiracy of complacency accommodated the 
payment of the bonus.
Notwithstanding the laxity in the policing of safety breaches by 
inspectors and in spite of advances in technology such as roofbolting, the 
erection of rib-props or rib-doweling, high velocity ventilation and 
improved underground lighting, danger is always present underground. 
Regardless of safety precautions, roof sections can still collapse, often 
without warning. Large volumes of methane can appear suddenly or ribs 
may burst unexpectedly. There is no human agency that can prevent such 
occurrences. At best, safety measures furnish uncertain protection against
83
Bulli mining disaster 1887
unforeseen circumstances only when safety regulations are meticulously 
observed.
One of the temptations of the bonus, however, is that it entices 
individuals to commit acts which go beyond limits for which safety 
measures were intended. The result may be a major disaster like the one 
which occurred at the Appin mine in 1979 when 14 men were killed by a 
methane explosion under circumstances which were not satisfactorily 
explained in official terms. Thankfully, disasters of the magnitude of 
Bulli and Appin have been rare. The more common result of the bonus' 
enticement is for individuals to commit acts which are not breaches of 
safety regulations but which cause injury to offenders ranging from minor 
to serious.
The range of transgressions against safety is varied and by no 
means are they universally practised. Indiscretions also vary from those 
which result in minor injury to the offender and which do not affect 
safety, to actions which may result in large loss of life. From the 1960s 
until the time of writing, while common minor indiscretions caused 
personal injury they do not necessarily endanger the lives of others. Such 
peccadillos include lifting of weights beyond an individuals' capacity, 
resulting in muscular and skeletal injury, and the misuse of tools which 
cause eye injuries or minor wounds to the limbs. Other forms of 
misconduct that may cause injury to others include careless driving of 
vehicles in roadways so as to crush individuals against props or rib-sides; 
leaving derelict equipment in the lesser, usually unlit roadways, creating 
hazardous obstacles and not 'sounding' the roof before commencing work, 
thereby inviting roof-falls with possible fatal consequences. However, it 
is not the intention to argue that the kind of behaviour outlined above is 
typical of the coalmining industry. Rather, the point is that the bonus has 
the potential to increases the incidence of such behaviour.
Generally, the most dangerous offences occur at the face. There 
are many serious types of misconduct at the face which may turn mines 
into disaster areas. For example, it was common practice since the 
introduction of continuous miners [30] during the 1960s to advance the 
face ahead of the last roof support as permitted under the Special Rules of 
the 1912 CMRA [31]. This procedure was resorted to in order to delay 
die interruption to production required to secure straps to the roof with
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roofbolts. Instead, mineworkers permitted continuous miners to advance 
several times the distance prescribed by law and secure two, three or 
more sets of straps and roofbolts in one operation. By these omissions 
they increased production by avoiding the mandatory individual pauses 
which created discontinuity to production and affected the bonus 
adversely.
The failure to provide systematic roof support makes a collapse 
of a roof a distinct possibility and can result in hundreds of tons of 
superincumbent strata subsiding. It is no surprise that despite the 
universal application of roofbolting, roof-falls have been one of the most 
prevalent causes of death underground [32], Another common safety 
infraction has been to cut headings wider than the statutorily permitted 
maximum to increase the shift's output. By 'robbing the pillars' the 
additional pressure created causes the 'crush' on the ribs to increase to 
such an extent that random rib-bursts capable of killing men could erupt 
suddenly without warning.
While roof and rib-falls have been the most common cause of 
death and injury they are not necessarily the most dangerous occurrences. 
The potential for death and injury arise from the frequent transgression of 
CMRA regulations governing the prevention of methane explosions. 
While fatal gas explosions have been rare this century, malpractices in 
gassy conditions are habitual and can turn mines into powder-kegs. 
Ironically, the vigorous enforcement of CMRA ventilation regulations by 
the Joint Coal Board which compelled management to install ventilation 
systems powerful enough to sweep away any quantity of gas also created 
a false sense of security. Because it was self-evident that ventilation was 
much stronger than ever before, mineworkers became increasingly 
inclined to take risks. Due to the changing composition of the workforce, 
by the time the bonus became almost universal during the 1960s, self- 
deception about the dangers of gas was the norm.
The inclination towards risk-taking was especially fuelled by the 
bonus. It became common practice to by-pass the methanometers, fail­
safe devices on continuous miners which automatically stopped the 
machine if  concentrations of gas reached dangerous proportions. 
Likewise, portable methanometers suspended in the optimum position 
from the roof near the face were deliberately damaged. Similarly,
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continuous miner drivers, as well as deputies, did not always test for gas 
in gassy places at the statutorily prescribed half hour [33] so as not to 
hold up production. Indeed, one of the attractions of the introduction of 
continuous production with four overlapping shifts in 1971 was to avoid 
this procedure which was otherwise mandatory between shifts.
Under normal circumstances, these and other omissions are 
inconsequential even if they result in small fires which are quickly 
extinguished. However, a sequence of unusual occurrences can turn an 
apparently innocuous omission into a holocaust. Such was the case at the 
Bulli colliery on 9 November, 1965 when a fire caused by the ignition of 
a body of inflammable gas killed four men and seriously injured three. 
On this occasion the accident was confined to the ignition of gas in a 
small heading, but could easily have been an instantaneous explosion 
affecting the entire mine [34], The mandatory investigation appointed by 
the M inister for Mines by virtue of Section 31 of the CMRA under 
Supreme Court Judge A. Goran originally apportioned no blame to 
anyone. This is a fairly predictable result of this type of inquiry and the 
mandatory inquests for lesser accidents owing to the conspiracy of 
complacency. The report was mainly confined to recommending 
amendments to the CMRA [35], In a supplementary report requested by 
the Minister, Judge Goran found no evidence of culpable negligence 
under common law, but recommended the issue of summonses for minor 
offences under the CMRA [36] - another typical outcome and one not 
dissimilar to the inquiries held into Bulli in 1887 and Mt. Kembla in 
1902.
At the Appin mine on 24 July 1979, gross neglect under gassy 
conditions and the illegal reversal of temporary ventilation in a longwall 
panel caused a gas explosion which killed 14 men. Like Bulli 14 years 
before, there was much breast-beating over the loss of life by the mining 
fraternity. Yet, despite private admissions by many in the Southern 
district that the 'accident' occurred due to the cutting of comers, no public 
acknowledgement was given to the connection between unsafe practices 
and the bonus. Instead, face-saving grief in public disguises the dangers 
induced by the bonus. There is a familiar echo about these reactions to 
large loss of life in coalmining disasters. At Bulli in 1887 and Mt. 
Kembla in 1902, economically driven industry practices convinced
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miners and officials of the adequacy of the prevailing safety conditions. 
As at Appin, mineworkers were so inured to danger that they felt that 
disaster would never overtake them. Of course, disasters of the 
magnitude of Bulli, Mt. Kembla and Appin are rare and some cold 
comfort can be drawn from this.
However, in the context of Bulli, few lessons have been learnt 
from the past. Despite high velocity ventilation and mining technology 
and techniques superior to Appin, aside from being innately dangerous 
workplaces, unsafe practices make work in coalmines far more hazardous 
than it needs to be. The inquiries held into the Appin disaster revealed 
that faulty workmanship under gassy conditions by an electrician and an 
illegal reversal o f a temporary ventilation system caused the explosion. 
The outcome of the Appin disaster inquiries have an all too familiar ring 
about them. The sad conclusion is that history may repeat itself and that 
calamity may strike again.
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Legislative Assembly, 1862-1887.
22. Votes and Proceedings. (1), 1862, p. 481.
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CHAPTER TWO
1. The use of the term 8 foot is a misnomer. The Bulli seam has 
been known to vary from 50 cms. to 3.6 metres in thickness.
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2. A dyke is a wall or sheet of igneous rock cutting through the 
coal. Dykes cause the natural cindering of the coal seam and are often 
associated with emissions of gas. In the nineteenth century, dyke 
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technology has overcome the obstructions caused by cindering; also the 
partially cindered coal is considered useful for specific industrial usages 
whereas in the 19th century it was considered waste material. Rolls are 
caused by strata stresses which cause the 'floor' of a coal seam to form 
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was obtained by implementing a formula based on an annual 4.1% 
increase of population in that district since 1881. The male population 
was then calculated at the 56% average total o f males for the district.
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book.
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drastically reduced to counteract another recurrence of excess capacity 
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18. Illawarra Mercury, 8 October 1861.
19. ibid., 8 October 1861; Letter from Thomas Hale, owner 
Bellambi colliery, to E. C. Merewether, general superintendent AACo., 
AACo Colliery Correspondence. Archives of Business and Labour 
A.N.U., (A.B.L.), Deposit l/57/9-cc-l-50.
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of Employees, claimant and the Southern Colliery Proprietors' 
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reduction in prices during the 1890s, production of coal and the income of 
Illawarra miners rose. For example, when the Illawarra hewing rate was 
2/9d. per ton in 1879 the hewers' estimated annual income was £58-16-0. 
However, for 1890, the most depressed year, when the hewing rate was 
2/4d. per ton, estimated income was £47-6-7 and £60-0-0 from 1894 
when the hewing rate was only 2/-. The hewers had to work much harder 
and longer hours, cut more comers and took greater risks (Dingsdag, 
1988).
22. The Union was formed as a result of a strike. The Bulli miners 
struck in early 1879 to support the Seamen's Union strike begun in 
November 1878 against the Australian Steamship Navigation Co.'s policy 
of employing Chinese crews.
23. When this amalgamation failed to increase its bargaining powers 
the Illawarra Branch of the A.M.A. attempted to secure legislation on 
safety and conditions during the 1890s by an active involvement in the 
burgeoning Labor Party and kindred organisations. Until approximately 
1904-10 the lodges also served as branches of the Labor Party. They 
selected candidates and successfully excluded outsiders. In 1895 the 
union was the A.M.A. Illawarra Branch Provincial Council A.L.F. 
(Australian Labor Federation). In 1898 it became the Illawarra District 
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Coalmining Employees' Association (Hagan & Turner, 1987).
24. 'Contract mining' is a misnomer. It is doubtful if written 
contracts between miners and owners were used after 1850, but the 
terminology remained. It appears the contracts disappeared after the 
AACo replaced its convict miners by free miners from Britain who 
worked off the fare the Co had paid to bring them to N.S.W. They were 
regarded as 'bound' or contracted.
25. That is with the exception of a cursory safety inspection by a 
deputy generally before the commencement of the shift. The diffuseness 
of working places and the complexity of layouts almost exclusively 
dictated that piece-workers should be unsupervised and that the mode of 
work was payment by result.
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APPENDIX A
The letter from J. Y. Neilson to F. W. Binney, referred to in Chapter 
Three of this book, is set out below.
Wallsend 2nd September 1888
F.W. Binney Esq.
My Dear Sir
As you know that with the exception of Fletcher I have had more 
experience of strikes in this Colony than any other Colliery Manager in 
the district. This added to my intimate knowledge of the men you have to 
deal with ought to give some weight to my suggestions therefore, I will 
briefly give you of my ideas on Strikes.
I may preface my remarks by saying that all my opinions are 
formed on the premises that there are no conflicting interests or difference 
of opinion inside the Master's Association, or in other words that the 
Masters are determined to fight the Miners to the bitter end.
First we must find out the character of our enemy which may be 
summarised as follows:-
1st Curley and the delegates
The former (Curley) is fighting for a big stake inasmuch as 
having led the miners into the breach, and should he bring them out 
victorious he will be a hero for a generation and a made man for life and 
will fight on the motto that all is fair in love or war, of course if he loses, 
he will get all the blame, and suffer the fate of all men who fail to carry 
out their promises to Mobocracy, or he will adopt some plan to carry out 
the Georginian theory of an equal distribution of wealth. The delegates 
are in a similar position to Curley but in a smaller degree and will obey 
Curley's orders to the letter until/s/ a pressure is put upon them by the 
quiet portion of the miners, and when they (the delegates) see that they 
must retreat each one will blame the other and all agree to blame Curley.
2nd
About 20% of the miners are thoughtless young men, the 
majority of whom do not care how long the strike may last and invariably
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vote tor mischief, regardless of consequences, as many of them are living 
on their parents. This is a serious contingent in the miners camp and are 
very difficult to deal with.
3rd
You have about 30% ot heads of families who are agitators, and 
who will tor a time follow their leaders, so long as there is a visible 
agitation and they can daily have their Courage kept up by some new 
rumour set afloat by the leaders viz. that "It will all be settled in a day or 
two as the masters are doing so" in fact they (the 30% of agitators) could 
not exist unless the struggle assumed some new feature every few days 
and their courage is in keeping with their instability, as the least 
depressing news would soon make them vent their spleen on the District 
officers and delegates.
4th
You have 50% of quiet house holders, and many of them with 
their little freeholds who seldom attend any ordinary meetings and even 
then have not the moral courage to vote or speak against any motion with 
which they disagree, and if they did they would be met with the usual 
larrikin calls of Put him out, He is a masters man" etc, etc, and thus for 
the sake ol peace they float with the tide; this they will do for a month in 
this case, as they will be bouyed up by continuous different reports got up 
by the delegates such as, We are sure to win in a few days as masters are 
going to do so and so, or are going to meet Mr. Brunker or some other 
notability etc., at the months end, they will begin to think that matters are 
becoming serious and will begin to agitate and express strong opinions in 
the little groups at the street comers and make dangerous bullets (which 
they dare not fire themselves) and hand them (the bullets) to some of the 
30% ot agitators who will without hesitation fire them at the delegates, 
then will commence the beginning of the end.
The above is a fair description of the men you have to deal with, 
and I think that you will agree with me that after a given time, the 50% of 
quiet miners are our best allies if they are not day by day supplied with 
the usual cry ol "It will be settled in a day or two", and hoping against 
hope they keep quiet, and if it is as assumed at the beginning of this letter, 
viz, that the Associated Masters intend to fight it out, a most passive 
attitude ought to be observed, as few of masters or managers meetings 
held as possible and those which are held kept secret and quietly wait the 
issue and as miners come out themselves let them ask to go in, but to
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keep finding the miners with rumours will indefinatly postpone a 
settlement.
If the above course had been pursued in 1873 strike masters 
would have won in six weeks instead of which all the wavering miners 
were clearly fed with rumours of a settlement and in eight weeks the 
masters were beaten.
The repeated attempts of outside parties to effect at settlement 
has done more injury that people in Sydney can understand it has if 
possible widened the breach and prolonged the agony and every apparent 
concession you have made is looked upon as a syn of weakness on your 
part, and I would respectfully recommend you as soon as you get rid of 
Messrs Brunker and Creer affair for the Associated Masters to intimate 
through the press or through Curley that the Masters do not intend to do 
anything more until miners apply for a settlement.
At our managers meeting on 28th ult, I showed my form of 
averages of miners wages (a copy of which I sent you) and it was agreed 
that each manager draw up a similar form of averages and have it at our 
meeting tomorrow with a view of sending them to you and 
recommending them to be published in all the leading papers in the 
Colonies, and with the high wages and short hours, it will prevent many 
of the workmen in other Unions who are not half as well off as your 
mines from subscribing.
Referring again to the effect o f rumours. Rumour of the 24th 
was, masters will not allow us to bring out tools. Rumour of the 27th 
having brought out our tools and most masters consented to allow us a 
week of syn of weakness, delegates report that it will be alright in a day 
or two. On 29th rumour. No. 1 that Mr. Gregson had run away could not 
stand the abuse same date. No. 2 that Mr. Gregson had left home and 
would not return for six weeks. This created quite a panic among the 
50% men, as they were then sure the masters meant mischief, then 
followed Brunker's arrangement and masters will settle it at their meeting 
on Tuesday next and everybody is happy for the time being. I detest 
strikes, and 1 can without egotism say that from 1873 to 1884 Mr. 
Fletcher and I settled more disputes and prevented more local strikes than 
we will ever get credit for, yet in this case the miners are earning higher 
wages than ever they have earned for 20 years, and Masters had having 
tor the sake of peace conceded all that honourable men could do, yet still 
the miners come out on strike, and having done all the harm they can to
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the trade, I trust the Associated Masters will unanimously agree to fight it 
out to the bitter end.
Your chances of success in present case are much more 
favourable than in any other previous strike inasmuch as now all the 
masters are making common cause, and have not the Lambton sending in 
1000 tons per day and Greta and other smaller Collieries nearly another 
1000 tons per day and miners giving 50% of wages as strike money.
If miners win there will be a universal agitation throughout the 
Colony for a "More Equal distribution of Wealth".
I am Dear Sir 
Yours truly
J. Y. Neilson
(Australian Agricultural Company Correspondence. Australian National 
University Archives of Business and Labour. Deposit No. E207/19).
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APPENDIX B
The following is one example of victimisation by the Department of 
Mines:
The Boycott
The M ines Act should be amended to penalise any boycotting or 
blacklisting of any officials or workmen who report or expose the 
existence of dangerous or defective mining conditions. The following 
examples have come under my own observation:-
1 James Crawford, a deputy at Bulli for some years, described 
before the Bulli Commission an occasion in the mine when he told a 
miner: "I will not fire this shot for you as the place is full of gas for 
twelve yards back" (see Report o f  the Bulli Royal Commission, question 
3378, p. 109).
Mr. Crawford afterwards obtained work as a deputy at another mine. 
When the Manager and Government Inspector went through the mine, the 
Inspector suggestively asked the deputy "if he ever found any yards of 
gas now".
(May, J. (n.d.). p. 17)
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